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The objective of this dissertation is to introduce a theory of the stability of rewards, 
justice evaluations and group cooperation with the results from three empirical tests of 
the theory. According to justice theory, rewards from exchange relations produce justice 
evaluations among individuals, leading to emotional and behavioral reactions. 
Specifically, unjust rewards cause lower levels of justice evaluations, positive emotions, 
and cooperative behaviors. Prospect theory and research on negativity bias posit the 
asymmetry between negative and positive events: negativ  events have a stronger effect 
than the same size of positive events on individuals’ perception. Combining the previous 
arguments, the theory introduced in this dissertation maintains that in repeated rewards 
events, the instability of rewards itself has a negative effect. That is, unstable rewards 
lower justice evaluations, positive emotions, and willingness to cooperate.  
The theory is tested with three mixed quantitative methodologies. Results from 
analyses of nationally representative sample survey data show that the stability of rules in 
workplaces has a positive effect on justice evaluations, willingness to work hard and 
willingness to stay in current workplaces among employees. Next, a controlled laboratory 
experiment tests the theory more rigorously. The results reveal the positive effect of the 
stability of rewards on justice evaluations, positive emotions, and cooperative behaviors. 
The second experiment replicates the results from the first experiment and confirms the 
effectiveness of the theory. The experiment also tets the effect of the presenting order
vi 
of instability of rewards and shows that reward instability occurring earlier has a stronger 
effect than that which occurs later. The implications of findings on sociological theory 
and other various areas are discussed.  
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People frequently face situations where their efforts in groups yield unstable rewards. For 
example, a referee in a sporting event can make bad calls. Some of these calls will be 
advantageous to one team, while others will be advantageous to the other team, but the 
calls will not be biased overall. Or in a company, an arbitrary boss can downplay an 
employee’s performance at one time and praise it at ano her, even though the employee’s 
performance is the same objectively in the two cases. In these situations, the outcome of 
the baseball game or the employee’s reward may not be affected by this instability in 
absolute terms since a disadvantageous event at one time can be canceled out by an 
advantageous event at another time. However, this dissertation expects that the athletes 
and the employee will perceive their situations as unjust. Even more, they may perceive 
that the final allocation of rewards (the outcome of the game or the salary paid) is 
unfavorable for them because the experience of under-reward is felt more keenly than the 
experience of over-reward (e.g., Homans 1974). 
In this dissertation, I explore the effects of reward stability on group cooperation 
through justice evaluations and emotional reactions t  rewards. Reward stability refers to 
the extent to which repeated rewards stay invariant over time. If a series of rewards is 
unstable, therefore, the level of its outcome fluctuates over time. Empirically, instability 
of rewards is conflated with unfairness of rewards in many situations because unstable
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 rewards frequently cause an unjust distribution of rewards. However, those two concepts 
are clearly distinguishable theoretically. The forme  focuses on the invariability of 
rewards in the time dimension, while the latter only considers the result of distribution at 
a specific point in time. Instability of rewards does not necessarily result in injustice of 
the outcomes in absolute terms; for example, if one incongruent reward is compensated 
for by another incongruent reward. On the other hand,  series of stable rewards can be 
unjust if they are invariably higher or lower over time than the just level of rewards 
would be. A large volume of previous research has investigated the consequences of 
injustice. But little of this has dealt with the effect of stability of rewards on human 
reactions and behaviors. 
To examine the net effect of stability of rewards on human behaviors, this 
research brings together justice theories and elements from cognitive psychology. Justice 
theory explains the various sources of justice evaluations and their emotional and 
behavioral consequences (Jost and Kay 2010). Cognitive psychology, specifically 
prospect theory and the concept of “negativity bias,” predicts individuals’ asymmetrical 
responses to events with opposite valences and explains why negative events are 
experienced more keenly than positive events. On the basis of combining these two lines 
of research, the theory presented in this dissertation predicts that the stability of a reward 
system has a positive effect on justice evaluations and emotional reactions, and 
consequently on cooperation among group members in exchange relations. On the other 
hand, rewards that are not stable but fluctuate between under-rewarding and over-
rewarding are predicted to reduce justice evaluations, positive emotions and cooperation 
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among people. Based on this reasoning, as well as previous research, I have built a theory 
about how the stability of rewards affects group cooperation.  
In presenting this theory, I first review justice theory. The theory of distributive 
justice has been developed since the 1960s. It is called equity theory since the researchers 
were mostly interested in the equity distribution rule in work situations (e.g., Adams 
1963). The theory examined how individuals perceive fairness in a situation and 
suggested that an allocation is fair if its rewards correspond to people’s contributions to a 
task (Adams 1965). The theory also explored the consequences of perceived fairness 
among people. Considerable research has shown that perceived injustice causes 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses among the reward recipients (e.g., 
Homans 1961; Walster et al. 1973).  
Later research pointed out the limitations of existing equity theory and expanded 
the theory. Scholars suggested the necessity of multidimensionality within the fairness 
rule and maintained that people use equality or the need-based fairness rule as well as the 
equity rule when they evaluate the fairness of a situation. Another line of research 
revealed that justice evaluations are not made solely n the basis of comparisons of actual 
rewards among proximate individuals, but also on the basis of comparisons between 
actual rewards and their subjective reward expectation levels (e.g., Berger et al. 1977). 
Researchers working on the theory also investigated th  various sources that affect 
people’s justice evaluations, and they consistently found that personal factors, e.g., status 
or social-value orientations, and situational factors, e.g., power position or network, 
affect justice evaluations. (See Hegtvedt 2006 for a recent review.) These studies show 
that justice evaluations profoundly depend on subjectiv  factors. 
4 
 
On the subjectivity of justice evaluations, previous research has shown that the 
effects of under-rewards on justice evaluations are stronger than the effects of the same 
amount of over-rewards on justice evaluations (Austin and Walster 1974; Jasso 1978, 
1980; Markovsky 1985). If there were no asymmetric effect of unjust rewards on justice 
evaluations, one might expect that a lower level of reward (say, 10% less than expected) 
could easily be canceled out by compensation at another time (10% more than expected). 
However, assuming the effect is not the same, the sum of the justice evaluations made 
about two unjust rewards in opposite directions with the same intensity should be lower 
than the sum of the justice evaluations made about two just rewards. This suggests that if 
the rewards are not stable but fluctuate between being higher and lower than an 
individual’s expectation level over time, the instability itself can reduce people’s justice 
evaluations.  
In addition to justice theory, cognitive psychology also posits a general tendency 
called “negativity bias” which shows how negative ev nts have a stronger influence than 
positive events on individuals’ perceptions in various human relationships (Baumeister et 
al. 2001). Prospect theory also posits that gains below the reference point (under-rewards) 
loom larger than corresponding gains above the reference point (over-rewards) because 
people are loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). 
These findings provide the theory of reward stability presented in this dissertation with 
the theoretical background necessary for explaining the asymmetric effects of unjust 
rewards, and the effect of stability of rewards on justice evaluations. The current research 
examines how repeated under- and over-rewards affect th  justice process.  
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The theory of procedural justice is deeply relevant to the role of stability of 
rewards on justice perceptions over time. This theory argues that not only the results of 
allocation, but the individuals’ experiences through the allocation process itself, affect 
justice evaluations. Research on procedural justice rev als that people are more likely to 
be satisfied with the results when the reward allocti n process fulfills certain fairness 
criteria. Those studies also suggest that the consistency rule is one of the criteria used to 
evaluate the fairness of distribution procedure, and they show the role of stability of 
procedure in justice procedures with extensive empirical evidence (Leventhal 1980). 
However, this argument does not offer any explanatio  for how the inconsistency of rules 
affects justice evaluations. 
Lastly, in regards to the consequences of justice evaluations, a great deal of 
research shows that perceived injustice causes emotional distress among individuals. The 
research also reveals that individuals use cognitive and behavioral reactions to reduce the 
distress that results from unfairness. Equity theorists predict that unjustly rewarded 
employees will change their contribution to or their r wards from the company, either 
actually or conceptually, in order to restore equity. It is also expected that they may quit 
their relationships with the group. More recent research shows that unfair company 
decisions cause employees to try to dissolve the relationship between themselves and 
their organizations through such methods as leaving the company, calling in sick, coming 
to work late, or pursuing their own interests (VanYperen et al. 2000). 
On the basis of previous research, this dissertation develops a theory about the 
effect of rewards stability on group cooperation. The theory assumes that among repeated 
rewards over time, under-reward at one particular time cannot be fully compensated for 
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by the same amount of over-reward at another time; wh reas over-reward at one 
particular time can be canceled out by smaller under-reward at another time. Through this 
mechanism, the instability of a reward system has a negative effect on justice evaluations. 
This theory also holds that the decreased justice evaluations can produce emotional 
distress, which in turn reduces cooperation among group members. Consistent with this 
argument, prior research on justice evaluations show  the causal relation between 
evaluated (in)justice and emotional, cognitive and behavioral reactions (Hegtvedt 2006). 
To this end, this research considers fluctuation of rewards through time as an 
important factor in shaping justice evaluations. Although many studies have investigated 
the antecedents and consequences of the justice pross, researchers have not taken into 
account the history of repeated rewards in examining the principles of justice evaluations. 
Instead, most studies on distributive justice have treated an individual’s investments into 
a group and rewards from the group as a single event, and focused on the results of the 
allocation of rewards. Therefore, they have not accounted for reward stability. Since most 
relationships in human society are embedded in a lager social context and last for a while 
(Granovetter 1985), it is necessary to examine justice evaluations in the dimension of 
time. 
In exchange relations in human society, however, transactions do not occur just 
once; on the contrary, people mostly belong to groups, contribute their resources to those 
groups, and get rewards repeatedly over time (Greenberg and Scott 1996; Wayne et al. 
1997). Justice evaluations, therefore, should not be viewed as independent from one 
another but rather as highly contingent upon each other. For this reason, it is necessary 
for justice theories to consider rewards as repeated ev nts (Cosier and Dalton 1983). 
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Based on this fact, the theory states that an unstable reward system affects group 
cooperation through justice evaluations and concomitant emotional reactions. More 
specifically, this study proposes that greater stabili y in the reward system will (i) 
enhance justice evaluations by group members, (ii) arouse more positive emotional 
reactions toward the rewards, and consequently (iii) increase members’ cooperation 
within the group.  
To evaluate this theory empirically, I use mixed quantitative methodologies. In 
the first study, I analyze secondary data from the 2009 Korean General Social Survey 
(KGSS). This is an analysis of the relationship betwe n stability of rewards and group 
cooperation. Though this study does not rigorously test the theory of this dissertation, 
nationally representative survey data show that stability of rules in an organization will 
affect members’ evaluations of rewards from the group; the stability of reward principles 
in an organization is thus positively related to grup commitment.  
In the second study, a controlled laboratory experim nt tests the theoretical 
arguments more rigorously. The experiment manipulates the stability of rewards at three 
levels and measures both subsequent justice evaluations of the rewards and emotional 
reactions to them. Finally, cooperation levels are measured as behavioral consequences. 
Multi-level analysis reveals that the stability of rewards is positively related to justice 
evaluations, positive emotional reactions, and group cooperation. The results also 
confirm the asymmetrical effect of unjust rewards more directly: the influence of under-
rewards is greater than that of over-rewards of the same size. 
For the third empirical study, another controlled laboratory experiment is 
performed to replicate the results of the experiment in the previous chapter and see how 
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serial positioning or sequencing effects justice evaluations among group members (Lilly 
et al. 2010). Specifically, this study manipulates the order of reward instability in four 
ways (stable or unstable reward first × under-reward or over-reward first) and tests the 
effect of the manipulation on justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and levels of group 
cooperation. This experiment shows how sequencing and appearance patterns of unstable 
rewards affect justice evaluation and its consequences. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I review the 
literature that serves as a background for developing the central theory of this research. 
Based on this background, in chapter 3, I present the heory of reward stability, justice 
evaluations and group cooperation. I describe the causal relationship between the stability 
of rewards and group cooperation via justice evaluation and emotional reactions. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 comprise empirical studies which test the theory that is developed in 
chapter 3. In chapter 4, I analyze secondary survey data set to test how the stability of 
organizational rules over time affects employees’ commitment level at work. In chapter 
5, a controlled laboratory experiment tests the theory more rigorously and shows the 
effect of stability of rewards on justice evaluations, emotional distress and group 
cooperation. Chapter 6 introduces an additional labor tory experiment that examines the 
effect of unstable rewards in different presentation orders. In the last chapter, I pull 
together the results of the empirical analysis and d ress the implications of this study for 








In this chapter, I review the theoretical background central to this dissertation. Individuals 
in cooperative relations are sensitive to the rewards they receive from the cooperation. 
The key factor in motivating individuals to participate in cooperative relations is their 
perception of the rewards they will receive from cooperating in comparison with the 
contributions they will make to the cooperative relation. People cooperate when they 
expect to receive greater profit from doing so than from pursuing the same endeavor 
individually. If cooperation is not viewed as profitable enough for group members, they 
are reluctant to cooperate. 
This dissertation is based on theories of distributive and procedural justice, and on 
prospect theory. Distributive justice focuses on the processes through which individuals 
make justice evaluations based on reward allocations, a d on the consequences of justice 
evaluations, while procedural justice investigates the consequences of variations in the 
rules regulating reward allocations (e.g., Clay-Warner et al. 2005). Negativity bias and 
prospect theory show the asymmetry of effects betwen gains and losses (e.g., Kahneman 
et al. 1991). Research on asymmetries suggests that if over-rewards can be regarded as 
gains while under-rewards can be regarded as losses in ju tice processes, justice 
evaluations can be biased toward injustice based on the asymmetry. The last part of this 
chapter revisits justice theory to examine the consequences of justice evaluations on 
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group cooperation. The effects of justice evaluations are extensive in that they cause 
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive reactions. 
 
2.1. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
Distributive justice theory (Hegtvedt and Cook 2001) focuses on the “fairness in the 
distribution of a set of outcomes to a defined circle of recipients” (Clay-Warner et al. 
2005, p 90). Research on distributive justice has investigated the antecedents and the 
consequences of justice evaluations among people. (For reviews, see Bierhoff et al. 1986; 
Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Hegtvedt 2006; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995.) In 
investigating how people produce justice evaluations in given situations, researchers of 
early distributive theory set down the equity rule as a criterion of fairness evaluation. 
According to this rule, individuals evaluate an allocation as fair when people are 
rewarded in accordance with their contributions to the group, which includes things such 
as time, effort, and indirect contributions such as educational achievements and seniority.  
The extensions to the theory look for factors other an objective reward levels 
that affect justice evaluations. A good deal of research shows that personal factors such 
as status (Berger et al. 2002) affect individuals’ ju tice evaluations. On the other hand, 
situational factors such as the presence of an anchor (Markovsky 1988a), a power 
position (Hegtvedt 1990; Hegtvedt et al. 1993) or acomparison network (Melamed et al. 
2014) have been pointed to as important elements tha  importantly affect justice 
evaluations. Another line of research suggests multi-dimensionality in distribution rules 
(Deutsch 1985; Lerner 1977; Leventhal 1980). Distribution rules specify criteria for 
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allocating rewards among individuals in a social system (Cook 1975; Markovsky 1985). 
Individuals produce justice evaluations based on the distribution rule suitable for the 
situation (e.g., equity, equality, or needs-based). Researchers argue that justice 
evaluations will vary with the distribution rules which are applied to the situations. For 
instant, justice evaluations based on equal distribution of outcomes across group 
members will be different from justice evaluations based on the rule which stresses more 
outcomes for group members with more needs. Regarding the results of justice process, 
the research shows that perceived inequality leads individuals to emotional distress, and it 
also reveals that they engage in further cognitive and behavioral reactions to get rid of the 
uncomfortable feelings.  
 
2.1.1 Equity Theory and the Proportionality Rule  
In the 1960s, Adams (1963, 1965) first developed moern distributive justice 
theory. Adams’ theory is also called equity theory because it suggests that equity is a 
main rule for evaluating fairness of reward allocation.1 According to the equity rule, an 
individual should get rewards or burdens from the group based on his/her input or 
contributions to the group. Equity theory assumes that people evaluate a situation to be 
fair when an individual who contributes more to thegroup’s performance gets more 
rewards from the group. The equity rule is most salient in work situations where 
productivity or efficiency is a central concern. Based on the equity rule, the theory posits 
proportionality of rewards as a general principle in evaluating the justice of rewards in 
                                                           
1 Leventhal (1980) pointed out that, in everyday language, “equity” is used in a broad 
sense and encompasses a whole different type of justice rule. However, justice theorists 
use the term in narrow a sense and defined “equity” as a merit- or contribution-based 
allocation of resources. In this dissertation, “equity” is used in the narrow sense. 
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exchange relations (Adams 1965). According to the proportionality principle, a situation 
is equitable (or just) when the investment-to-reward r tio for one person is equal to the 
investment-to-reward ratio for another person, whereas inequity (or injustice) occurs 
when the ratios of investments to rewards are not ident cal between two actors.  
Distributive justice theory also investigates how individuals respond to perceived 
injustice in emotional, cognitive, and behavioral wys. Emotionally, perceived injustice 
arouses distress among the individuals in the group (see Turner 2007 for a review). The 
distributive justice theory states that there is a positive relationship between the perceived 
intensity of the injustice and the emotional distres of the individual; the distress 
increases as the perceived injustice becomes more severe (Homans 1974). Distributive 
justice research also discovered that not only under-reward but also over-reward causes 
emotional distress among its recipients (Anderson et al. 1969; Walster et al. 1973). That 
is, individuals feel bad about results where their own rewards are higher than the 
expected level, as well as when their rewards are low r than the expected level. The type 
of emotions produced by over-reward and under-reward are not the same, however. In 
terms of types of emotions, when individuals face unfair rewards it mainly causes anger, 
disappointment, and ingratitude, while over-rewards mainly causes guilt and feeling of 
indebtedness (Adams 1963; Homans 1961; Leventhal et al. 1969; Walster et al. 1973).  
Importantly for the current study, Adams pointed out that under-reward causes 
greater emotional reaction than over-reward (Adams 1963). Based on the evidence from 
Adams’ studies, Homans held that under-rewarded individuals are much more likely to 
claim injustice than are over-rewarded individuals (Homans 1974). Austin and Walster 
(1974) also performed an experiment to examine the effect of inequity on levels of 
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contentment. The research showed that the contentment level was higher when the 
subjects were fairly rewarded than when they were unfairly rewarded. They are more 
content and less stressed when they are over-rewardd than when they are under-
rewarded. 
Another major contribution of equity theory is the finding that the effects of 
perceived injustice are not limited to emotional rections, but extend to cognitive and 
behavioral responses. Adams (1963) argued that facing unjust rewards, individuals will 
suffer from discomfort. Following dissonance theory (Festinger 1954), he also 
maintained that the individuals will change their investments and/or rewards in either 
behavioral or cognitive ways to eliminate the distre s. Through these changes, individuals 
can restore equity to their relationships in which they contribute resources to get rewards. 
If inequity is not reduced by behavioral or cognitive means, the actor is more likely to 
leave the relationship. Put differently, if inequity remains, the individual become less 
committed to the relationship (This will be discussed in more detail later). 
 
2.1.2 Extension of Equity Theory and Distributive Justice 
Though the early distributive justice theory (equity theory) suggested equity as a 
reward allocation rule and explained its applications, the theory was applicable only to 
quite restricted situations because it assumed that individuals evaluate the fairness of their 
rewards only in term of their contributions to the outcomes (e.g., Leventhal 1980). Equity 
theory was, therefore, pertinent to locally isolated economic exchanges such as 
workplace situations. The theory was difficult to use in explaining justice processes in 
situations where the equity rule is not salient or where local comparison is not applicable.  
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One limitation of the equity theory is that it addresses uni-dimensionality of 
justice evaluation rules (Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Deutsch 1985; Komorita and 
Chertkoff 1973; Lerner 1974). Equity theory posits that individuals evaluate the fairness 
of their rewards based only on the equity distribution rule. However, many studies 
pointed out that equity is only one rule that may be used to evaluate the fairness of 
various situations. Walzer (1983) argued that there are various spheres in the real world 
and those different spheres need different criteria of justice evaluations. For example, 
friends prefer equal distributions (see Cook and Hegtvedt 1983 for a review). 
To explain the justice process in various situations, researchers introduced the 
multi-dimensional model. They classified the rules for justice evaluations into three 
concepts: equity, equality, and need; and they maintained that each rule is directed 
toward different objectives. Specifically, equity rule stresses on contributions. Therefore, 
if equity is used for justice evaluations, the recipient will focus on the ratios between 
contributions and rewards among people. The equity r le is more likely applied when 
group members try to promote productivity in their groups. Therefore it is more relevant 
to workplace settings than to other situations. Theequality rule, which is different from 
equity, focuses on rewards that are distributed ident cally among recipients. Equality is 
relevant to groups who try to enhance harmony among members. The third distribution 
rule is based on needs, which justifies greater rewa ds to people facing greater 
necessities, such as giving tax credits to people with many children or taking affirmative 
action to promote the opportunities of minorities in a society. The needs-based rule is 
supposed to attend to the welfare of members of the group (Deutsch 1985).  
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Justice evaluations, even those in the same situation, should not be the same 
across individuals if each of them gives different weight to different justice rules. Justice 
judgment theory argued that individuals combine multiple rules when they evaluate 
fairness of a situation2 (Leventhal 1980). Since each individual may view the same 
situation differently from how others view it, justice evaluations of rewards from the 
situation should vary across individuals. For example, the justice evaluations of a person 
who is most concerned with the efficiency of the group should be different from those of 
a person who places greater stress on the harmony of the group, because the former 
places more value on the equity rule while the latter places more value on equality. The 
multi-dimensionality of justice evaluation rules presents the possibility that justice 
evaluations can be affected by the subjective application of justice evaluation rules. 
Another identified weakness of equity theory is that it relies solely on a local 
comparison (Berger et al. 1972a; Berger et al. 1972b). Equity theory assumes that people 
produce justice evaluations based on comparisons of the ratios between contributions and 
rewards with proximate others. A just distribution s then achieved when the ratios 
between contributions and rewards are the same across all recipients. For instance, if a 
colleague whose performance is the same as mine is paid $10/hr, I would have to be paid 
$10/hr to evaluate the reward as fair. If I were paid $8/hr or $11/hr instead of $10/hr, I 
would perceive the situation to be unfair. Under this formulation neither recipient can 
                                                           
2 Leventhal suggested the rule-combination equation as,  
 
Deserved Outcome = wcDby contributions + wnDby needs + weDby equality + woDby other rules  
 
where, w is a weight, D is deservingness, wc, wn, we, and wo are the weights on the rules 
for contributions, needs-based, and equality, and any other aspects, respectively 
(Leventhal 1980, p. 30). 
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make correct justice evaluations because the ratios between the contributions and the 
rewards are congruent between two people even if both of the recipients are unjustly 
rewarded. If two actors are under-rewarded to the same extent (e.g., if both get $8/hr in 
the above illustration), both of them will perceive that their rewards are just according to 
equity theory, despite a collective state of injustice. Furthermore, a slightly under-
rewarded individual may perceive herself to be over-rewarded if she compares her reward 
with more severely under-rewarded colleagues (e.g., if one is paid $9/hr while other is 
paid $8/hr) (Zelditch et al. 1970). 
Berger and this colleagues also pointed out that equity theory cannot grasp the 
effect of status in reward distributions and showed how status shapes performance 
expectations in working groups (Berger et al. 1977). Equity theory explains unequal 
distributions of rewards in terms of quality and quantity of contributions to group tasks. 
According to this theory, therefore, not only the effort or time that a person puts directly 
into the group, but also things such as status chara teristics (e.g., education level or 
seniority) can be regarded as investments that lead to higher rewards. However, this 
theory cannot explain the effects of ascribed statues such as age, race, ethnicity, and 
gender, on unequal rewards since those status characteristics cannot be achieved by 
individuals’ efforts.  
To overcome those limitations, the status value theory of distributive justice 
proposed a referential comparison (Anderson et al. 1969; Zelditch et al. 1970). The 
theory explained how differences in status characteistics shape patterns of reward 
distributions via reward expectations. In the referntial comparison, individuals formulate 
reward expectations which is defined as beliefs about their own rewards from socially 
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validated expectations for rewards for people “like m ” (Berger et al. 1972b). Based on 
referential information about associations between states of status characteristics and 
reward levels, individuals each develop their own co cepts of deserved reward levels 
based on their own status. If an individual’s own reward is lower than the socially shared 
expectation, that individual will perceive him/herslf to be under-rewarded, whereas if 
the reward is higher than the socially acceptable expectation, the individual will perceive 
him/herself to be over-rewarded. The theory shows the role of reward expectations 
resulting from an association between status and an unequal distribution of rewards in a 
group over time.  
In sum, distributive justice theory explains the justice evaluation process and the 
consequences of justice evaluations. Early distributive justice theory suggested the equity 
rule and showed emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses arising from justice 
evaluations among recipients. Researchers extended distributive justice theory by 
overcoming the limitations of equity theory. In so d ing, they provided the multi-
dimensional justice evaluations rule and the idea of referential comparisons. This line of 
development suggests that the feeling of (in)justice is not the product of a comparison 
between actual and objectively just rewards, but a product of a comparison between 
actual and subjectively expected rewards. In more rec nt justice theory, therefore, 
injustice is defined as incongruence between the actual and the expected reward level, not 
as incongruence between the actual and objectively fair reward (Cook 1975; Jasso 1980; 
Markovsky 1985). Thus, an objectively fair allocation may not appear to be fair from a 
subjective point of view (Hegtvedt et al. 2003). In the next section I will discuss the role 




2.2. JUDGMENTAL BIAS AND ASYMMETRY 
 
The previous section reviewed distributive justice h ory, focusing on equity 
theory and the ways in which the subjective aspects of justice evaluations become 
important in justice theory. As was discussed earlir, justice evaluations are influenced by 
many subjective factors, such as the justice rules each individual uses to evaluate a 
situation, or the expectation level produced from referential comparisons. Research has 
also found that the effects of unjust rewards on justice evaluations are unbalanced and 
that under-rewards are more powerful than over-rewads of the same magnitude (e.g., 
Austin and Walster 1974). Following this line of reasoning, this dissertation examines the 
asymmetric effects of under-rewards and over-rewards on justice evaluations in repeated 
reward events.  
Generally, the asymmetric effect is that evaluations f differences between two 
objects are affected by the reference point (Vogelaar and Vermunt 1991). In other words, 
people pay more attention to an event below the reference point than to an event above 
the reference point. Applied to justice theory, this finding explains how under-rewards 
come to have a stronger effect than the same sized ov r-rewards on individuals’ 
perceptions. This asymmetry between the effects of unjust rewards in opposite directions 
is, however, not predicted only by justice theories. A line of study in cognitive 
psychology found judgmental bias in a wide range of human behaviors, and provides a 
theoretical argument explaining the asymmetry of justice evaluations.  
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Tversky and Kahneman developed prospect theory, which holds that gains below 
the reference point (under-rewards) loom larger than corresponding gains above the 
reference point (over-rewards) because people are loss averse (Kahneman et al. 1991; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984). Their experiments showed that in an exchange 
relation, each bargaining party places more value on what they currently possess than on 
a target utility that would replace their current possessions. In one experiment, 
participants were randomly assigned to be sellers or buyers of a mug. The experimenter 
asked each seller to decide the minimum price at which e/she would sell the mug, and 
also asked each buyer to decide the maximum payment he/she would buy the mug. On 
average, the buyers were willing to pay at most $2.87, while the sellers would not give up 
the same mug for less than $7.12 (Kahneman et al. 1990). The researchers explained that 
the disparity occurred because the individuals overestimated the losses they would suffer 
in the exchange, as compared to their prospective gains (Carmon et al. 2003; Dhar and 
Simonson 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In other words, the loss from the 
exchange looms larger than the gain. 
Researchers have found a general tendency towards pe ceptions of asymmetric 
events, called negativity bias (Baumeister et al. 2001). With this bias, people pay more 
attention to negative entities than positive entities in various types of human relations. 
Rozin and Royzman (2001) maintained that negativity bias is manifested in four more 
specific types of biases. Negative potency is the tendency to perceive a negative event as 
being more potent subjectively and therefore more sali nt than its positive counterpart. 
The greater steepness of negative gradients shows tat the marginal effects of negative 
events grow faster than the marginal effects of equivalent positive events. Negativity 
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dominance states that the overall evaluation of integrated negative and positive events is 
more negative than the sum of the subjective values of all the events. Lastly, greater 
negative differentiation posits that negative entities yield more sophisticated and 
elaborate perceptual differentiation than positive entities. This extensive review of the 
negativity bias also revealed that it occurs in a wide range of human behaviors.  
The asymmetry between under-reward and over-reward has not drawn much 
attention from justice theorists as a main topic in the justice evaluation process. However, 
this phenomenon has long been noticed by justice res a chers (Adams 1963; Austin and 
Walster 1974; Jasso 1980; Markovsky 1985). Researchrs have argued that under-reward 
has a stronger effect than the same amount of over-reward on justice evaluations. If there 
are two actors, A and B, in an exchange relation, and one (A) is over-rewarded and the 
other (B) is under-rewarded at the same intensity, B’s justice evaluation level will be 
lower than A’s (Adams 1965; Homans 1974). Although justice researchers have argued 
theoretically for this asymmetry, very little empirical evidence of it has been reported. 
Walster and colleagues (1973) performed a laboratory experiment and showed that the 
level of perceived fairness is highest among people who are rewarded at the expected 
level. Moreover, in comparisons between different unjust situations, justice evaluations 
are higher in the over-reward situation than in the under-reward situation when the 
intensity of the injustice is the same. Jasso (1980) formulized the asymmetry using survey 
data (Jasso and Rossi 1977). She postulated that the effect of injustice perceptions on 
justice evaluations is logarithmic: the effect of under-rewards gets stronger as the 
disparity becomes more severe, while the effect of over-reward lessens when the 
disparity becomes more severe (Jasso 1980). In subseq ent research, Markovsky (1985) 
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confirmed the logarithmic function of the effects of unjust reward with a controlled lab 
experiment. 
Regarding the source of the asymmetry in the justice process, research suggests 
that it arises because of individuals’ mixed motivations in justice evaluation situations. 
That is, individuals are strongly concerned with the fairness of a given situation and try to 
achieve fairness in the situations that they face (Lerner 1977). Therefore, as stated earlier, 
when individuals experience unfairness, they feel uncomfortable and try to restore justice 
to the situation. However, justice theory also assumes that individuals in relations try to 
maximize their profits in relationships, and that the self-interest motivation is a powerful 
determinant of human behavior (Miller 1999; Walster et al. 1973). For this reason, when 
individuals are under-rewarded, the negative perception caused by the self-interest 
motivation strengthens the negative perception caused by the fairness concern, and 
intensifies the effect of the unjust reward. On the other hand, when individuals are faced 
with over-rewarded, the self-interest motivation cacels out (a portion of) the perception 
of injustice produced by the fairness consideration. Adams observed that “the threshold 
would be higher presumably in [the] case of over-reward, for a certain amount of 
incongruity in this case can be acceptably rationalized as ‘good fortune’ without attendant 
discomfort” (Adams 1965, p.282). Van den Bos and his colleagues (1997) showed that 
when overpaid, people experience a conflict between th  fairness motivation (feeling 
guilty) and the egocentric motivation (preference for the rewards), and that those mixed 
motivations lead them to moderate levels of satisfaction regarding their rewards. Van 
Prooijen and his associates (2008) investigated the effects of social value orientation 
(SVO) and fairness-based responses to procedural justice. The results from their 
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experiments and a field study reveal that individuals with pro-self orientations are more 
affected by procedural justice than individuals with pro-social orientation. This research 
shows how egocentric motivation affects justice evaluations. 
Previous justice research has not examined the asymmetric effect in sequential 
rewards over time (Cosier and Dalton 1983). Due to this limitation, the existing research 
does not address the asymmetric effect of unjust rewards over time, and assumes that 
only the final states of reward allocations are used to evaluate the fairness of a situation. 
To overcome this problem, this dissertation assumes that the sum of justice evaluations of 
each reward event will not be the same as the justice evaluations of the aggregate reward. 
In testing this assumption, I examine the causal effects of unstable reward systems on 
justice evaluations through time. 
 
2.3. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
 
Although this study is based distributive justice th ory, procedural justice also provides 
the current study with several useful implications. The research shows that justice 
evaluations of procedural aspects also affect people’s emotional and behavioral responses 
to their group. Procedural justice points out the limitations of the outcome-centered 
model of distributive justice, which assumes that individuals are motivated solely by 
concern for receiving favorable outcomes from their group. In contrast to this approach, 
research on procedural justice maintains that indivduals also care about the fairness of 
the procedures by which outcomes are allocated and decisions are made when they 
evaluate the fairness of authorities (Tyler 2010). Importantly to this dissertation, 
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procedural justice shows that justice evaluations are not made entirely on the basis of the 
distribution, but are also affected by individuals’ experiences during the allocation 
process.  
Thibaut and Walker (1975) were the first scholars to demonstrate that the fairness 
of a decision-making procedure affects people’s sati faction level with legal authorities 
independently of the favorability or fairness of the outcomes it produces. They assumed 
that people value having some control over the decision-making process because they 
expect that their control of the process will bring them favorable results In multiple 
laboratory experiments, the researchers tried to find s tuations in which disputants were 
most likely to be satisfied with the results of conflict resolutions involving third-party 
intervention (Thibaut and Walker 1978; Thibaut et al. 1974). Their results showed that 
people are more satisfied with a result when the process that generates it includes their 
voices or choices in the decision-making process, even if the result itself is opposed to 
their interests. On the other hand, disputants’ satisfaction levels are the lowest when both 
the decision-making process and the decision itself ar  ully controlled by the third party.  
This model is called the instrumental model because procedural justice serves as 
an instrument that ensures fair or favorable outcomes for the reward recipients (van 
Prooijen et al. 2008). The instrumental model of prcedural justice enriches justice theory 
by showing that not only the outcomes of allocations, but also experiences throughout the 
allocation process, influence people’s justice evaluations. However, this theory does not 
consider the long-term relationships between allocators and recipients of rewards. Rather, 
this model only considers one allocation occasion and does not take into account 
repeatedly occurring reward situations over time (Tyler 1989). 
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Tyler and Lind developed the group-value model of pr cedural justice which 
focuses more on non-instrumental motivation in justice evaluations. The group-value 
model explains that people pursue procedural justice not for instrumental reasons, but 
based on symbolic and psychological mechanisms (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1989). 
This model assumes that people look to group membership for their long-term social 
relations because it provides them with self-identity. Individuals value fairness in the 
decision-making process because the way they are treated by their group shows how 
much they are valued and respected by that group. Lind and Tyler suggested three aspects 
of procedures – the neutrality of the decision-making procedure, trust in the decision-
making authority, and the information about individuals’ standings in the group as the 
criteria of procedural justice and confirmed the effectiveness of these criteria with an 
experiment.3  
Researchers consistently found that when individuals perceive that they are 
treated with fairness in decision-making procedures by authorities, they are more likely to 
comply or cooperate with the authorities in various settings (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; 
Tyler 2010). In recent years, research has also shown the effects of procedural justice on 
emotions such as happiness, disappointment, anger, and frustration, etc. (Krehbiel and 
Cropanzano 2000). However, this model does not focus n the variability of rewards over 
time. 
                                                           
3 To investigate the effect of reward stability, this dissertation includes controlled 
laboratory experiments in which reward allocation procedures are equated by design. In 
the experiments, the procedures may be perceived by the subjects as unjust in terms of 
Tyler and Lind’s three aspects, but those affect all conditions the same and hence issues 
of procedure are controlled by design. See Chapter 5.  
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Leventhal (1980) proposed six rules by which indiviuals can evaluate the 
fairness of procedures: consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, contractibility, 
representativeness, and ethicality. Among these, the consistency rule is most closely 
related to the present research. The consistency rule states that the allocation process 
should be consistent across actors and times. Consiste cy across actors requires that a 
similar allocation rule should be applied regardless of the recipient and it should not be 
more advantageous to some people than to others. Con istency across times dictates that 
an allocation rule should be stable over time. Based on previous studies, Leventhal 
predicted that violation of the consistency rule would harm procedural justice 
evaluations, and a few recent studies provide empirical evidences that consistent 
application of standards is indeed one of the factors f r evaluating procedural justice 
(Barrett-Howard and Tyler 1986; Greenberg 1986). However, these studies are rare, and 
most of them do not distinguish consistency across times from consistency across 
recipients (Folger and Konovsky 1989), or else they lean more toward consistency across 
actors than consistency over time (Folger and Bies 1989; Niehoff and Moorman 1993). 
Procedural justice research widened the horizon of justice theory by moving its 
focus from reward allocation results to the ways in which the results were arrived at 
(Cropanzano and Folger 1989). Introducing the concept of a consistency rule, this 
research has started to consider time in justice evaluations. However, procedural justice 
research differs from the current study on some points. First, although it suggests the 
concept of consistency as one criterion for procedural j stice evaluations, only a handful 
of studies have empirically tested the effectiveness of consistency so far. Secondly, the 
empirical research examining the impact of consistency has only focused on consistency 
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across actors (e.g., employees). Therefore, the effects of fluctuations of allocation rules 
through time have not been tested rigorously. More importantly, while procedural justice 
investigates the factors that regulate the distribution of rewards, the current study tries to 
explain how instability in the distribution of rewards affects justice perceptions. 
Procedural justice examines the influence of procedures independently of their outcomes 
for justice evaluations. 
 
2.4. CONSEQUENCES OF JUSTICE EVALUATIONS 
 
Justice research predicts three types of reactions resulting from justice evaluations: 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral. Equity theory p oposes that the results of allocation 
provoke emotional reactions among people such that they will be satisfied with equitable 
rewards but will feel distress from inequitable rewards (Adams 1965). Further, theories 
predict that the intensity of this distress is proportionate to the magnitude of the perceived 
inequity of the situation, and that the thresholds are lower for under-reward than over-
reward (Austin and Walster 1974; Homans 1974). Research rs have therefore predicted 
that in order to avoid unpleasant feelings employees will a) change their actual 
contributions or rewards, b) psychologically distort either their own or others’ 
contributions or rewards, c) change their reference oth rs, or d) leave the relationship 
(Adams 1965; Walster et al. 1978). Empirical studies do offer supporting evidence for 
hypotheses derived from Adams’ theory. (See Goodman and Friedman 1971 for a 
comprehensive review of the evidence for Adams' theory).  
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More recently, researchers have argued that reacting to unfair distributions is one 
of the fundamental features of humans by showing that c ildren effectively react to unfair 
situations from as early as age three, and that by round age six they have moderate 
levels of competence in requesting fairness (LoBue et al. 2011). One vein of research 
found that individuals care about fair distributions and take actions to restore fairness to 
situations even when it is costly for them to do so (e.g., Fehr and Gachter 2002), and that 
their actions to restore fairness to the situation are mediated by emotions (Chebat and 
Slusarczyk 2005). 
 
2.4.1 Emotional reactions  
Justice theory has paid attention to emotional reactions since the early stages of 
justice research (Turner 2007). Many studies have tested the prediction that perceived 
injustice produces emotional distress among individuals in that situation and confirmed 
the effects: people are more content when they are fairly rewarded than when they are 
under- or over-rewarded. Adams (1965) reported anger and guilt as the main emotional 
reactions to under-reward and over-reward, respectively. Homans (1974) also maintained 
that justice evaluations produce emotional responses. P ople are satisfied with fair 
results. But when they are unjustly rewarded, people react unfavorably: under-rewards 
produce anger, while over-rewards produce pleasure and guilt. Homans also predicted 
that the magnitude of the emotional reactions would be proportionate to the intensity of 




Considerable research has empirically established t relationship between justice 
evaluations and emotional responses. Cropanzano and Folger (1989) manipulated the 
autonomy of the decision and reference points of their rewards in their experiment, and 
they found that unfair outcomes, when coupled with unfair processes, produced negative 
emotions among participants. Similarly, Weiss and his associates (1999) found that 
effects of positive emotions (e.g., happiness) were highly dependent on distributive 
justice, while negative emotions (anger, guilt) were influenced by a combination of 
distributive and procedural justice. Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000) and Hedgtvedt and 
Killian (1999) also observed that unfair outcomes produce negative emotions and that 
procedural justice plays a little role.  
While most studies have measured emotional distress using self-report 
questionnaires after injustice occasions (e.g., Jasso nd Rossi 1977), other research 
adopts neuro-scientific approaches to directly measure participants’ reactions. Markovsky 
measured physiological arousal right after participants received results using a galvanic 
skin response measure and found that perceived unjust rewards produced higher skin 
conductance than perceived just rewards (Markovsky 1988b). Tabibnia and her associates 
(2008) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test the impact of fairness 
on positive emotions. Consistent with Markovsky’s re earch on the emotional impact of 
fairness, this research confirmed that the reaction is i stant, automatic and intuitive 
without delay. Focusing on the positive emotional impact of fairness, their results reveal 
that not only unfair situations produce negative emotions, but also fair situations produce 
positive emotions; fairness of rewards leads to happier individuals. 
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Emotions arising from justice evaluations mediate behavioral responses. 
VanYperen and his associates (2000) found that perceived injustice causes negative 
emotions among individuals, which in turn causes destructive behavioral reactions such 
as exit, neglect, and aggressive voice in the workplace. Murphy and Tyler also found that 
negative emotions produced by violations of procedural j stice played a mediating role in 
resistance to authorities (Murphy 2009; Murphy and Tyler 2008). 
 
2.4.2 Behavioral reactions  
Observable behavioral reactions to perceived injustice have also drawn justice 
researchers’ attention. Justice theory assumes that individuals who suffer from emotional 
distress aroused by perceived injustice will tend to eliminate the distress by restoring the 
fairness of allocation (Walster et al. 1978). To reduce their distress, that is, individuals 
can attempt to change the allocation pattern, actually or perceptually: over-rewarded 
people are expected to increase their contribution relative to under-rewarded people, 
decrease their productivity within the group, or take more profit from the group. If these 
methods are not available or they are too costly, the individuals are expected to leave the 
relationship.  
Though previous justice research has been interested in the roles of emotion in 
justice process, emotion had not been a main topic in exchange process until 1990s. It is 
mainly because exchange theory traditionally assume that individuals are motivated by 
instrumental reasoning and they make decisions based on rationality. Therefore, 
exchange theory views emotion as a residual. However, researchers show that 
individuals’ behaviors are guided not only by reason but also by emotions (e.g., Frank 
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1988), and emotions are widely influenced by context, process and the outcomes of 
exchange (Lawler and Thye 1999). Relational cohesion theory clarifies the role of 
emotions in group cooperation (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; Lawler et al. 2000). 
According to this theory, frequent exchange promotes group cohesion, which is mediated 
by positive emotion. That is, the positive emotions generated from exchange relations 
lead individuals to a higher level of commitment to he group, which results in behaviors 
such as gift giving, staying in the group and contributing more to the group. In this line of 
reasoning, it is expected that individuals feel positive emotions based on having received 
fair rewards from groups, so they are more likely to cooperate with those groups.  
Social science provides abundant evidence of how unfairness harms 
organizations. Studies have shown that unjust actions by their company lead employees 
to be uncooperative or even destructive by leaving the organization, acting irresponsibly, 
and aggressively expressing their voice to pursue their own interests (VanYperen et al. 
2000). The same study showed that injustice induces those destructive impulses in 
organizations through negative emotions such as distress, hostility, and irritability. 
Empirical evidence also shows that under-paid workers are more likely to have poor 
work attitudes (Folger and Konovsky 1989) and to engage in theft from their companies 
to make up for the under-payment (Greenberg and Scott 1996). Chebat and Slusarczyk 
(2005) investigated behavioral responses to unfair treatment in customer relations in the 
service industry and found that perceived injustice leads to customers having lower levels 
of loyalty to the company.  




Distributive justice theory offers a wide range of theoretical implications for this 
dissertation. It explains the antecedents of justice evaluations and its consequences. In 
particular, based on the equity rule, the early distributive theory explains how justice 
evaluations are produced among individuals and explains the emotional and behavioral 
responses to perceived injustice. This research also found that under-reward has a 
stronger effect than an equivalent over-reward. 
Distributive justice theory was developed by taking i to account the subjectivity 
of justice evaluations. It shows that justice evaluations are not based only on absolute 
ratios of investments to outcomes. Rather, justice evaluations can be biased by 
individuals’ subjective preferences (such as different justice rules) by which individuals 
evaluate their rewards, or the referents they use for valuating their reward levels. Among 
the judgmental biases in justice evaluations, this study focuses on the asymmetry between 
under-rewards and over-rewards.  
Prospect theory and negativity bias explain the asymmetry in the effects of unjust 
rewards with different valences. According to this t eory, a negative event has a stronger 
effect on human perception than a positive event of the same intensity. This theory 
explains the findings from equity theory that under-rewards have stronger effects than 
over-rewards in justice evaluations and on emotional distress. 
Research on procedural justice also provides us with theoretical insights. The 
research shows that individuals evaluate situations not only based on their outcomes but 
also based on their own experiences of the procedures that regulate the outcome 
allocation. Importantly for the present research, procedural justice also considers the 
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justice process through time. Research also suggests that consistency over time and 
across actors are important criteria.  
Recent research on justice has been focusing more on the consequences of justice 
evaluations. Justice evaluations produce emotional distress among individuals and lead to 
behavioral responses. Researchers have also discovered that emotion plays a mediating 
role between justice evaluations and behavioral consequences. 
Based on the theoretical background reviewed above, I pr sent a theory of reward 
stability, justice evaluations and group cooperation in the next chapter. In doing so, I also 
present the scope conditions to which the theory can be applied. Then I introduce the 




A THEORY OF REWARD STABILITY , JUSTICE EVALUATIONS  
AND GROUP COOPERATION 
 
This chapter presents a theory that draws upon and integrates the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Previous research illustrated the subjectivity of justice evaluations, and the 
emotional and behavioral consequences of justice evaluations. This literature also 
suggests the asymmetric effects of unjust rewards, that is, that under-rewards are more 
keenly experienced than over-rewards. A theory of reward stability, justice evaluations 
and group cooperation will explain the impact of reward stability on the justice process. 
At the heart of the theory is a path that suggests that the instability of the reward system 
itself decreases justice evaluations among individuals, leading to increased emotional 
distress and subsequently lower levels of cooperation within the group. 
 
3.1 SCOPE CONDITIONS 
 
The phenomena predicted by the presented theory do not manifest in every context of 
social relations. Rather, like other scientific theori s, the theory presented in this study 
can be applied to a limited set of scope conditions (Walker and Cohen 1985).  
First, individuals are motivated to invest in exchange relations with the 
expectations of better returns on their investments than if they were to pursue the outputs 
individually (Axelrod 1984; Walster et al. 1978). Justice theory, especially distributive  
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justice theory, is based largely on exchange theory, which regards maximizing self-
interest as a main motivation for cooperation (Homans 1961; Walster et al. 1978). 
Though not every real-world relationship is founded on maximizing self-interest, in most 
forms of human cooperation, the participants pursue profits. The current theory examines 
human relations where individuals try to maximize th profits they receive from their 
exchange relations. 
Second, the theory presented here applies to exchange relations, in which 
individuals are to be rewarded for their investments and contributions directly from the 
recipients of their contributions, for example direct xchange or productive exchange 
relations (Emerson 1972; Lawler et al. 2000; Molm 1994). In this type of exchange, 
individuals can track their investments and rewards from the group more accurately. This 
condition is quite different from that of indirect exchange relations, such as generalized 
exchange. In a generalized exchange, individuals’ rewa ds do not return directly to the 
contributor but return to other individuals in the group. In such a situation, the contributor 
cannot keep precise track of the history of rewards. Thus, the effect of the history of 
rewards will not be prominent. 
Third, this theory applies to social exchange relations characterized by repeated 
transactions over time among group members as opposed t  one-time economic 
transactions between strangers (Molm et al. 2001). Many social exchange relations occur 
in groups that are stable over time and space and individuals interact with each other 
multiple times in the groups. Under these circumstances, the justice evaluations of 




3.2 REWARD STABILITY, JUSTICE EVALUATIONS AND GROUP 
COOPERATION  
 
At the heart of a theory of reward stability, justice evaluations and group cooperation is a 
path that addresses the way that the stability of rewards produces a higher level of justice 
evaluations and a lower level of emotional distress, and subsequently affects group 
cooperation positively. Before I go further, however, the concept of stability of rewards 
needs to be clarified. The stability of rewards is defined as the extent to which a series of 
rewards stays invariable over time. In many cases, th  instability of rewards is conflated 
with the unfairness of an allocation of rewards because unstable rewards can produce an 
unjust distribution of rewards. However, a series of unstable rewards does not result 
necessarily in an injustice of outcomes if one incongruent reward can be compensated by 
another incongruent reward. Conversely, a series of stable rewards could produce an 
unjust allocation of rewards if those rewards are invariably higher or lower than the just 
level of rewards over time. Though instability of rewards and injustice of allocations are 
closely related empirically, this theory demarcates the instability of rewards from unjust 
rewards and tries to investigate the net effect of reward stability. 
Considerable previous research has studied the conditions that maintain higher 
levels of justice evaluations in groups (see Hegtvedt 2006 for a review). According to the 
research, both fair procedures and the fair distribution of rewards in the allocation of 
rewards affect justice evaluations among group members. However, past research on 
justice evaluations did not consider time in explaining the process of justice evaluations 
(Lilly et al. 2010). Rather, the research was interested mostly in the result of a single 
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reward (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974). As a result, the researchers ignored the role of the 
history of rewards in the justice process and assumed that only the final state of rewards 
matters in producing justice evaluations.  
One reason that justice evaluations through time should be addressed is that in 
everyday life, exchange relations among individuals are not one-time transactions. On the 
contrary, individuals usually belong to groups and repeat exchange relationships with 
others in the same groups. From relationships with intimate partners or close friends to 
economic transactions, individuals frequently sustain repetitive relationships. Sometimes, 
certain exchange relationships last for large periods f a person’s lifetime. In those 
situations, individuals’ justice evaluations about their groups are not independent but are 
highly contingent upon each other.  
Though the time dimension in human relations has been neglected widely, a few 
researchers showed the history of exchanges and the shadow of the future play critical 
roles in shaping individuals’ responses to their groups or to other group members. 
Literature on trust shows that people build trust relations through a series of risk-taking 
behaviors over time (e.g., Cook et al. 2005). Therefore, without experiences of repeated 
exchange relations, individuals cannot establish trust relations with others. Axelrod 
(1984) showed that the “shadow of the future” promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD). Individuals who rationally pursue self-interest cannot cooperate with each 
other in the PD game because mutual defection is a dominant strategy of the game 
(Komorita and Parks 1996). This causes a social dilemma, where collective interests are 
at odds with individual interests. According to Axelrod, however, if they think the 
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exchange relationship will last with the same partner, they perceive the characteristics of 
the game as the assurance game instead of the PD game and then they can cooperate.  
Another reason that time should be considered in the justice process is that when 
they make justice evaluations, individuals focus on b th the overall result of reward 
allocations and on changes in the rewards. Prospect th ory challenges the common 
assumption that only the final state matters when people make a decision. The theory 
asserts that individuals focus more on changes or diffe ences than on the state of the 
situation itself (Kahneman 1994; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Novemsky and 
Kahneman 2005). Moreover, the theory shows that individuals take into account the gains 
and losses relative to their reference point to evaluate a situation and that losses loom 
larger than gains of the same size. This suggests tha  the aggregation of all the justice 
evaluations of individual rewards will not be the same as the justice evaluation of the 
aggregation of a series of rewards at the final stage, when rewards are repeated over time. 
It is also predicted that the variability of the rewards itself affects justice evaluations 
among the members, irrespective of the eventual objective reward levels. Extending the 
idea of asymmetry into justice evaluations through time allows us to theorize about the 
relationship between over-reward and under-reward at different times and about how 
much reward is needed to compensate for an unjust reward to keep the individuals’ 
justice evaluations at a desirable level. 
The present theory begins with the assumption that instability of rewards over 
time produces the feeling of being under-rewarded among individuals. In turn, the feeling 
of being under-rewarded lowers justice evaluations. This is consistent with the findings 
of justice theory and prospect theory. As stated above, both justice theory and prospect 
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theory show that unjust rewards have a negative effect on justice evaluations among 
group members regardless of the direction of the injustice. To remedy the damaged 
justice evaluations, an opposite direction of unjust reward (compensation) is necessary. 
However, because of the asymmetry in the effects of under-reward and over-reward on 
justice evaluations, an over-reward of the same amount as a previous under-reward 
cannot fully cancel out the negative effect of the under-reward. On the other hand, an 
under-reward at one time can more than fully offset th  effect of the same size of over-
reward at another time. In fact, it will have a netgative effect on justice evaluations. 
Therefore, if the intensity of incongruence is the same in both cases, justice evaluations 
made in light of either an under-reward followed by an over-reward, or of an over-reward 
followed by an under-reward, should be lower than those made in response to two just 
rewards. 
Let’s assume that two unjust rewards are equally incongruent with the socially 
expected reward level, but in opposite directions. The first one is an under-reward, A-, at 
one time, t1, and the other is an over-reward, A+, at another time, t2. The individual is 
expecting a just level of reward, A0 in both cases. In terms of actual reward levels, an 
under-reward at one time, A-t1, can be canceled out by the same size of an over-reward at 
another time, A+t2. In this situation, the overall actual reward will be the same as the just 
reward at t2, A0t2, in objective terms: A-t1 + A+t2 = A0t2. Thus, the instability of rewards 
has no effect on the reward system in absolute terms. In other words, he/she is justly 
rewarded overall. 
However, when it comes to justice evaluations, they ar  not experienced the same 
way as an objective reward level is perceived. Because of the asymmetric effects of 
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rewards of opposite directions, the level of evaluated injustice of an under-reward, E-t1, 
will be greater than that from an over-reward at a later time, E+t2. In other words, the 
effect of under-rewards is stronger than that of over-rewards of the same size: |E-t1| > 
|E+t2|. Therefore, the overall justice evaluation of the situation is lower than the justice 
evaluation from a just reward situation: E-t1 + E+t2 < E0t2. As a result, the justice 
evaluation will be lower than it would be if there w re no asymmetries between unjust 
rewards at all. The situation is the same if over-reward comes first E+t1 and the under-
reward E-t2 is presented later. The under-reward deletes the incongruence from the former 
over-reward. But the evaluated overall justice level from those rewards is lower than the 
justice evaluation level from a just reward: E+t1 + E-t2 < E0t2.  
In turn, the present theory asserts that justice evaluations from unstable rewards 
lead to emotional reactions in predictable ways. Early justice studies have shown that 
evaluated injustice will cause emotional reactions a d that the intensity of those reactions 
is positively related to the level of evaluated injustice (Adams 1965; Anderson 1965; 
Walster et al. 1973). The present theory assumes that unstable reward structures cause 
perceptions of injustice despite the fact that justrewards “average out” over time. If this 
is true, then individuals in unstable reward systems should feel distress even though they 
are rewarded at a just level overall, and the level of distress is proportionate to the 
evaluated injustice. 
The present theory is complete with consideration of the effect of instability on 
cooperation levels, which is mediated through justice evaluations. Based on rational 
choice theory, research on exchange relations has long neglected the role of emotion in 
social actions (Lawler and Thye 1999). However, researchers have investigated the effect 
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of emotion on individuals’ behaviors. Relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 
1993, 1996) and the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) explain how 
emotional arousal affects members’ group-oriented behaviors. These theories assert that 
positive emotion toward the group, produced by structural power and exchange 
frequency, leads individuals to enhance their commit ent to the group via a higher level 
of cohesion. A relational model of procedural justice also reveals that a feeling of being 
valued by group leads individuals to compliance with the authority of the group (Tyler 




Moving forward, I derive a series of logically interr lated assumptions from the 
conceptual system introduced in section 3.2. The cor of the theory is a causal model that 
suggests the effect of stability of rewards on justice evaluations and accompanying 




The first assumption addresses the relation between the stability of rewards and 
the degree of negativity bias. Prospect theory suggests the asymmetric effects of unjust 
rewards in opposite directions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Research on negativity 











+ - + - 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Model of Reward Stability and Group Cooperation 
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of positive entities (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Based on those arguments, this theory 
assumes that individuals produce feelings of being under-rewarded when they experience 
unstable rewards and the intensity of the feelings are proportionate to the intensity of the 
instability of rewards. Based on the previous studies, Assumption 1 of the present theory 
states that,  
Assumption 1: The more unstable the reward system, the more strongly it 
produces negativity biases in perception of rewards. 
The main argument of justice theory is that feelings of being under-rewarded will 
lead individuals to negative justice evaluations and that the size of (in)justice evaluations 
will be proportionate to the amount of negativity bias. Thus, the second assumption of the 
present research asserts that, 
Assumption 2: The stronger the negativity biases on perception of rewards, the 
stronger the injustice evaluations among the actors. 
The third assumptions of the theory states the positive relationship between 
justice evaluations produced by unstable rewards an emotional distress:  
Assumption 3: The stronger the injustice evaluation, the stronger the emotional 
distress. 
The last assumption of the present theory asserts the behavioral consequences 
resulting from the emotional distress among individuals. The theory focuses especially on 
the level of cooperation as a behavioral reaction:  
Assumption 4: The stronger the emotional distress, the less the members of a 




Together, these assumptions constitute a theory explaining how reward stability is 
related to cooperation in groups. The logical relationship between the assumptions allows 
for the derivation of several hypotheses that will be tested in subsequent chapters. 
Specifically, three empirical studies were designed to test the theory presented in this 
dissertation. The first empirical study analyzed secondary survey data to test how the 
stability of the rules that determine rewards in workplaces influences employees’ 
willingness to cooperate with the company (beyond their motivation toward self-
interests). In the second empirical study, I performed a controlled laboratory experiment 
to test the theory more rigorously. This experiment t s ed the hypotheses that trace the 
path from reward stability and group cooperation via justice evaluations and concomitant 
emotional distress. In the last empirical study, I examined how presentation orders of 




ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY SURVEY DATA  
 
In the previous chapters, I reviewed the theoretical background and presented the basic 
assumptions of the theory presented in this dissertation. This theory suggests a 
relationship between the stability of rewards and group cooperation through justice 
evaluations and concomitant emotional distress. Based on justice theory and prospect 
theory, I assume that unstable rewards decrease the l vel of justice evaluations, positive 
emotions within a group, and willingness of group members to cooperate. In the next 
three chapters, I introduce empirical studies that test the effectiveness of the presented 
theory.  
Using a nationally representative sample survey from South Korea, the first 
empirical study aims to show how the stability of rules in organizations affects 
employees’ justice evaluations and commitment to their companies. Employees are 
usually in long-term exchange relationships within t eir organizations and are mostly 
motivated by self-interest (Wayne et al. 1997). Therefore, a workplace setting is well 
suited to the scope conditions of the theory present d i  Chapter 3.  
In this chapter, I investigate the effects of stability of rules on justice evaluations 
and attitudes towards the organization. The theory developed in this dissertation predicts 
the effect of the stability of rewards on subsequent r actions. However, in many cases, 
the instability of rewards comes from the instability of rules that decides the distribution 
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of resources in groups. Although the empirical study in this chapter does not test directly 
the arguments of the theory presented in this dissertation, it serves as a preliminary 




Based on the assumptions stated in the previous chapter, this study developed a set of 
hypotheses. First, I assume that unstable rules in workplaces cause instability of rewards 
in those workplaces. Of course, not all unstable rewa ds result from unstable rules. For 
instance, instability of rewards can be caused by indiv dual characteristics or by the noise 
of the rewards system (Kollock 1993). But if rules are unstable in a group, they inevitably 
produce unstable rewards in the group. Derived from the first and the second assumptions 
of the theory introduced in the previous chapter, the first hypothesis states that,  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more stable the employees perceiv  their workplace rules 
to be, the more likely the employees will be to think that their payments 
from the companies are just. 
The theory tested in this research predicts behavior l reactions from the stability 
of rewards. To test this process, the first study measures the effect of the stability of rules 
on staying behavior and intention to work hard, both of which are indicative of 
cooperation. Though it does not test every causal step of the theory, this study 
investigates the main path of the theory, which assert  a relationship between justice 
evaluations and group cooperation. The second hypotesis states pertains to the 
relationship between the stability of rules and willingness to stay.  
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The more stable the employees perceiv  their workplace rules 
to be, the more likely the employees will be to stay a  their current 
workplaces, even if better payments are available from other companies.  
The third hypothesis states the relationship between th  stability of rules of the 
company and employees’ intentions to work hard for their company.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The more stable the employees perceiv  their workplace rules 





The study analyzes nationally representative survey data from the 2009 Korean General 
Social Survey (KGSS). The KGSS is an annual nationwide survey conducted by the 
Survey Research Center (SRC) at Sungkyunkwan University since 2003. Adopting the 
latest GSS of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) as a model, each wave of 
the KGSS consists of replicated core questions, the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP) annual topic module, and special modules. In 2009, the special module was 
“Inequality and Fairness,” which encompasses various questions on peoples’ justice 
perceptions and wageworkers’ attitudes toward their workplaces, both relevant items for 
testing the hypotheses in this study.  
To meet the rigorous requirements of the ISSP, the KGSS used full probability 
sampling procedures across the country. The population was defined as household 
residents aged 18 or over who live in South Korea. From this population, the three-stage 
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area probability sampling method selected 250 sample blocks, and 10 individuals are 
sampled from each block. The 2009 KGSS consists of 1,599 respondents with an overall 
response rate of 64%.4 This study analyzes data from 657 wage-earning respondents 
working for someone else. 
 
4.3 MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSES 
 
Dependent variables – The main interest of this study is the effect of rule consistency on 
workers’ justice evaluations and their group commitment levels. To test H1, the 
dependent variable is the employees’ justice evaluations regarding their payments from 
their workplaces. The survey question asked how just they perceived the payments from 
their companies to be. Their answers were measured in five-point Likert scales (see 
Appendix A for the details of the questionnaire).  
The other hypotheses predict that stability of rules affects individuals’ cooperation 
levels within their groups. To measure the cooperation level within their groups, I use 
two questions. One question measured employees’ intent ons of staying with the 
company by asking how willing they would be to turn down another job opportunity that 
offered them a little bit more pay than their current company. The other question 
measured their willingness to work harder than they ave to in order to help their 
company. Both of these variables were measured on five-point Likert scales.  
                                                           
4 Further information on KGSS and the data set is avail ble at the Korea Social Science 
Data Archive (KOSSDA, www.kossda.or.kr) or at the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR 34665, www.icpsr.umich.edu).  
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Independent variables – The independent variables, predicted to affect justice 
evaluations and cooperation levels within the company, were measured in two different 
questions. The first question asked how free from arbitr riness employees thought their 
company’s rules were. The other question asked how stable respondents perceived the 
rules in their companies to be over time. Both setsof answers were measured on a five-
point Likert scale.  
Control variables – The KGSS data contain comprehensive demographic 
variables used for controlling variables. Each stati tical analysis controls for respondents’ 
gender, age, education level, wage from the job, sujective social class, and marital 
status.  
Gender is coded as 0 for “male” and 1 for “female.” Marital status was originally 
asked in six categories: married, widowed, divorced, s parated, never married, and 
cohabitating. For the purpose of this study, marital st tus was recoded as a dichotomous 
variable using 0 for “currently not married” and 1 for “currently married.” In both the 
original survey and this study, educational achievement was measured in eight categories 
ranging from 0- no formal school to 7- Graduate school (Ph. D). Respondent income was 
defined as the monthly wage from respondents’ workplaces and measured in South Korea 
won (KRW). Subjective social class was measured in a 10-point Likert scale that ranges 
from 1- bottom to 10- top. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the study.  
Analysis – All the dependent variables (justice evaluations, willingness to work 
hard, willingness to stay) are measured in five-point L kert scales. Those categorical 
variables cannot meet the basic assumption of OLS regression, which requires  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female1 657 .429 – 0 1 
Age 655 39.736 11.227 18 84 
Education 657 4.061 1.353 0 7 
Married2 657 .661 – 0 1 
Income 653 5.342 3.142 0 21 
Social Class 657 4.700 1.524 1 9 
No Arbitrariness 615 2.418 .996 1 5 
Consistency 615 2.863 1.047 1 5 
Justice Evaluation 654 2.416 .723 1 5 
Work Hard 623 3.856 .819 1 5 
Stay 624 2.946 1.247 1 5 
1 Male is the reference category. 
2 Currently unmarried is the reference category.  
dependent variables to be measured in continuous form. The typical measure to handle 
categorical variables in regression analysis is to use logistic regression. Among the 
various logistic regression models, “ordered logit” analysis is the most useful when the 
categories of each variable can be ranked in order and the distances between the various 
categories are not the same (Long 1997) (see Appendix B for the tests of the proportional 
odds assumption).  
 
4.4 RESULTS  
 
The first analysis tests Hypothesis 1 (H1) which describes the relationship between the 
stability of rules and justice evaluations of employees’ payments (see Table 4.2). After  
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Table 4.2 Summary of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimating Justice Evaluations 
 










Female1 1.163 (.200) 1.146 (.198) 1.144 (.197) 
Age .993 (.009) .990 (.009) .992 (.009) 
Education .913 (.069) .918 (.069) .926 (.070) 
Income 1.002 (.001)**  1.002 (.001)***  1.002 (.001)**  
Class 1.324 (.084)***  1.311 (.084)***  1.309 (.083)***  






    
1.272 (.098)**  
N 609 
Log Likelihood – 627.083  – 623.807 – 622.131 
Pseudo R2 .037 .042 .045 
LR Chi2 48.000 54.560 57.910 
*p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001  
1 Male is the reference category. 
2 Currently Unmarried is the reference category.  
list-wise deletion for all three models, 609 cases are used in this analysis. Overall, the 
results from the test support H1. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes only control  
variables. Comparisons with the baseline model show t e net effect of the independent 
variables. Models 2 and 3 include the main effects: no arbitrariness and consistency, 
respectively. Statistics for model fit show that Models 2 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 6.56, 
p =.010) and 3 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 9.91, p =.002) are significantly better than 
Model 1 (the baseline model), which includes only control variables. In Model 1, 
respondents’ incomes and subjective social class are positively related to respondents’ 
justice evaluation levels.  
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Model 2 tests the effect of arbitrariness in rules regarding their companies’ pay on 
employees’ justice evaluations. The result shows a positive effect of the independent 
variable; each unit increase in perceptions of non-arbitrary application of company rules 
results in a 23.4% increase in the odds of reporting a fairer income. Model 3 shows that 
consistency of rules in employees’ workplaces is also positively related to their justice 
evaluations of their payments from the companies. Each unit increase in perceptions of 
the consistency of workplace rules results in a 27.2% increase in the odds of reporting a 
fairer income. 
The second analysis tests H2 that describes the effect o  stability of reward on 
staying behavior when better alternatives are availble (see Table 4.3). Model 1 (baseline 
model) presents the effects of control variables and shows that age, income, and class are 
positively related to employees’ staying behaviors.  
Model 2 tests the effect of arbitrariness on staying behavior. The statistics for 
model fitness show that the models with the main effect variables are significantly 
improved over Model 1, which only includes the contr l variables (Likelihood-Ratio 
Chi2(1) = 5.61, p = .018). Model 2 shows that while age, income, and subjective social 
class still have significant effects on staying behavior; each unit increase in perceptions 
of non-arbitrary application rules of their workplaces associates with a 20.1% increase in 
the odds of staying with their current workplaces, even when better alternatives are 
available from other companies than their counterparts. Model 3 also supports H2 in that 
each unit increase in perceptions the consistency of workplace rules results in a 23.7% 




Table 4.3 Summary of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimating Willingness to Stay  
 










Female1 1.228 (.198) 1.210 (.196) 1.211 (.196) 
Age 1.033 (.009)***  1.031 (.009)***  1.033 (.009)***  
Education .961 (.067) .967 (.068) .984 (.069) 
Income 1.001 (.001)* 1.001 (.001)* 1.001 (.001)**  
Class 1.150 (.067)* 1.139 (.066)* 1.131 (.066)† 






    
1.273 (.092)***  
N 611 
Log Likelihood – 928.518 – 925.713 – 922.995 
Pseudo R2 .029 .032 .035 
LR Chi2 55.750 61.360 66.800 
†p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001  
1 Male is the reference category. 
2 Currently Unmarried is the reference category.  
 
that Model 3 is significantly different compared with the baseline model (Chi2(1) = 11.05, 
p < .001). 
The third analysis tests H3 which describes the relationship between the stability 
of rewards and employees’ willingness to work harder than they are required to help their 
organizations’ success (see Table 4.4). Model 1 (the baseline model) shows that age and 
income are positively related to willingness to work hard. In terms of model fit, a 
likelihood-ratio test reveals that the Model 2 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 4.16, p = .041) 
significantly improves over the Model 1. Model 3 is marginally improved over the Model 
1 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 3.54, p = .059).  
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Table 4.4 Summary of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimating Willingness to Work 
Hard 
 










Female1 .912 (.154) .904 (.153) .899 (.152) 
Age 1.019 (.009)* 1.016 (.009)† 1.018 (.009)* 
Education .918 (.066) .921 (.067) .924 (.067) 
Income 1.001 (.001)* 1.001 (.001)* 1.001 (.001)* 
Class .976 (.060) .969 (.060) .971 (.060) 






    
1.152 (.086)† 
N 610 
Log Likelihood – 714.304 – 712.222 – 721.535 
Pseudo R2 .015 .018 .018 
LR Chi2 22.290 26.450 25.830 
†p ≤ .1, *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001  
1 Male is the reference category 
2 Currently Unmarried is the reference category  
The second model strongly supports H3. Each unit increase in perceptions of non-
arbitrary application of company rule associates with a 17.8% increase in the odds of  
working harder than they have to work. Though the significance is not as strong (p = 
.060) as Model 2, Model 3 shows the marginal effectiv ness of the independent variable; 
each unit increase in perception of the consistency of workplace rules results in a 15.2% 
increase of the odds of working harder than they ar required from their company. 





4.5 DISCUSSION  
 
This study tests a theory about the relationship betwe n reward stability and group 
cooperation using data from a national sample survey. The survey asked wageworkers in 
South Korea about their perceptions of the stability of rules that decide the reward 
distribution in their companies. The respondents also nswered questions regarding their 
justice evaluations and their willingness to stay in their current companies and work hard 
for them. Three sets of logistic regression analyses support the hypotheses. Net of other 
variables, employees who believe that their workplace rules are not arbitrary and are 
applied consistently over time evaluate their payments from the company to be more just 
than employees who believe otherwise. Moreover, the former is more willing to stay at 
their current jobs, even though higher monetary incentives are available from other 
organizations, and they are willing to work harder than they are required to work.  
These results are consistent with the theory in this dissertation and support the 
hypotheses stated in section 4.1. Assuming that the stability of rewards in a group 
originates with the stability of rules that regulate the pattern of resource distribution in the 
group, this study shows that arbitrary and inconsistent application of rules lowers justice 
evaluations of rewards and cooperation levels within e group. The results of this study 
show that the stability of rules will affect people’s justice evaluations and behavioral 
reactions, as predicted in previous research (Leventhal 1980).  
This study has its limitations. First, despite the str ngths of the representative 
sample survey, the analyses of survey data are not nough to test a theory rigorously, 
especially when the theory has not been tested previously. Though cross-sectional sample 
data provide external validity to the results, from this methodology, it is difficult to infer 
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a causal relationship among theoretical components, particularly when psychological 
measurements are included in the analysis (Singleton and Straits 2005). Second, this 
study tests the effect of the stability of rule as a proxy measurement for the stability of 
rewards. In the real world, the stability of allocation rules and the stability of rewards 
rules are closely related empirically. Logically, however, those two concepts are clearly 
distinguished. Therefore, it does not directly testhe effect of the stability of rewards on 
justice evaluations and its consequences, which the theory of this dissertation states.  
Considering the limitations, the next chapter introduces a controlled laboratory 
experiment that tests the causal relationship suggested in the theory more rigorously. In 
the controlled laboratory experiment, objective reward level will be manipulated to 




AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE EFFECT OF REWARD STABILITY  
 
The results from the study detailed in Chapter 4 demonstrated that employees’ justice 
evaluations of the payments from their companies and their commitment to their 
companies are positively related to the stability of rules which allocate rewards in the 
organizations. However, more scrupulous testing is needed to investigate the causal 
relationship among the variables. Thus, the second study of this dissertation uses a 
controlled laboratory experiment to test the foregoin  theoretical discussion. By 
controlling other factors in the real world, the exp rimental method is the best way to 
confirm the effects of the manipulated factors predicted in a theory, deprived of possible 
alternative explanations (Thye 2007). The aim of the experiment is not to replicate any 
naturally occurring situation in the real world, but to test a theory-driven argument on the 
relationship between reward stability and group cooperation. Provided the theory is 
supported, it may then be applied to explain real world phenomenon (Zelditch 1969).5 
The main purpose of this experiment is to test the basic theoretical argument 
discussed in the previous chapters. Combining justice theory and negativity bias, I predict 
that the stability of rewards is positively related o a higher level of justice evaluations 
among group members. This experiment tests the prediction empirically. The effect of 
unjust rewards on justice evaluations over time has yet to be tested empirically, whereas
                                                           
5 There has been criticism on the external validity of experiments in social sciences, and 
Thye (2007) among others provided a justification fr experimental methods. 
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many researchers have tested the emotional and/or behavioral consequence of justice 
evaluations. Therefore, it is necessary to test whether and how instability in rewards 
affects justice evaluations. This experiment tests novel implications of justice theory and 
prospect theory. 
The second purpose of the experiment is to test the entire sequential process from 
reward stability to group cooperation, by way of justice evaluations and emotional 
reactions. The theory asserted in this dissertation predicts the emotional and behavioral 
consequences of the perceived justice evaluations. Therefore, this experiment measures 
emotional reactions, behavioral decisions, and justice evaluations to test the whole 




To test the theory, the current experiment tests a et of hypotheses derived directly from 
the assumptions stated in Chapter 3. First, the present d theory assumes that the 
instability of rewards causes negative bias in the justice evaluation process and 
consequently decreases justice evaluations among grup members. Combing 
Assumptions 1 and 2, this study hypothesizes the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The stability of the reward structure is positively related to justice 
evaluations. 
Assumption 3 asserts a negative relationship between justice evaluations and 
emotional distress. Conversely, it suggests a positive relationship between the instability 
of rewards and emotional distress. The second hypotesis of this study is as follows: 
57 
 
Hypothesis 2: The instability of the reward structure is positively related to 
emotional distress. 
Assumption 4 explains low levels of group cooperation as a result of emotional 
distress. If Hypotheses 1 and 2 are correct, we can also hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The stability of the reward structure is positively related to group 
members’ cooperation. 
 
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The experiment took place in the University of South Carolina’s Laboratory for 
Sociological Research. The experiment was a completely randomized single factor 
design, manipulating the stability of rewards. The stability of rewards was manipulated at 
three levels: a stable-reward condition (control condition with very little variability), a 
low-instability condition, and a high-instability condition.  
Subjects – Undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina were asked 
to participate for pay in this study. A project assistant contacted volunteers through a 
web-based subject pool management system to schedule a session in the laboratory. The 
experiment had 30 subjects in each of three conditions for a total of 90 subjects in the 
experiment.  
General Procedures – Subjects were placed in isolated rooms with the personal 
computers on which they completed the experiment. The experimental protocol was 
completely computer mediated, which minimizes interaction between the participants and 
the experimenter while recording the participant’s a titudes and behaviors. This 
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procedure was designed to reduce the possibility of demanding characteristics (Orne 
1962) and other sources of bias.  
Upon arrival, research assistants guided the subjects to separate computer-
equipped rooms. The subjects were informed that the study addresses reward satisfaction 
in a group task and asked to complete a consent form. After completing the consent form, 
the subjects read a description about a group cooperation situation. They were asked to 
take part in artificially controlled group tasks tha  guaranteed more profits through 
collaboration than through individual achievement. 
Specifically, the instructions explained that the subjects were in a four-person task 
group that consisted of one manager (M) and three pogrammers (P1, P2, and P3). They 
were told that the role of each subject was randomly assigned, and that only one subject 
was assigned to the manager’s position while the otr three people were assigned to the 
programmers’ roles. However, all the subjects were assigned to one of the programmers’ 
roles (P2), and the manager and other programmers were simulated by the computer 
program.  
The cover story stated that there was demand for new computer programs in the 
marketplace. Each computer programmer was able to dvelop his or her own program to 
meet the demands. However, if the programs were devloped and marketed in-house, 
both the programmer and the company could save on indirect costs, such as 
advertisement. Thus, the company was asking freelanc  programmers to develop the 
software cooperatively. The company promised to distribute the profits according to the 
contributions of each programmer. The company expected that the invested resources 
would bring 1.5 times higher revenue from the market.  
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According to the company’s guidelines, the manager is supposed to return 1.3 
times the investment made by the programmer and keep 0.2 times the investment for 
profit. The programmers were told that despite the guidelines, their rewards would be 
decided by their manager at the end of every contribution opportunity. That is, although 
the manager was supposed to distribute rewards based on the company’s guidelines, the 
final decisions were up to the manager. The subjects could not participate in the reward 
allocation process, but they could express their reactions to their reward levels by 
answering the questionnaires presented after each investment opportunity (Refer to 
Appendix C for the instructions and survey questions for the experiment). The 
participants could decide the amount of resources th y invested in subsequent investment 
opportunities.  
At the end of the instructions, several quizzes were administered to make sure that 
the subjects understood the structure of the experiment. Then the subjects participated in 
the investment opportunities (exchange sessions). The subjects engaged in 14 rounds of 
investment-reward trials. Each experiment took about 30–50 minutes for subjects to 
complete. After the subjects finished the experiment, they were debriefed and paid in 
cash.  
Reward Stability Manipulation – Prior to starting the group task, subjects were 
informed in detail about the processes that determined reward levels, and they were 
primed to expect 1.3 times higher rewards than their investments in each round from the 
company. Depending on the condition, subjects engaged in a number of investment-
reward events. Upon completion of each round of investments, each subject received a 
share of the group product as a reward. 
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In the stable-reward condition, rewards from the company varied between 1% and 
3%. In the low-instability condition, reward levels deviated from the promised reward 
level within 30% (20% on average), either positively or negatively, according to 
predetermined parameters. This enabled the researcher to test the net effect of instability 
of the reward system.  
In the high-instability condition, all situations were the same as in the low-
instability situation except for the rate of incongruence between subjects’ expected 
rewards and their actual rewards. In this condition, rewards deviated more than 30%, but 
the deviation did not exceed 50% (40% on average) from the expected reward level. It is 
important to note that in both the slightly and sever ly unstable situations, at the end of 
the group task, the overall reward level was the same s the expected level. Except for the 
fair reward trials (trial 7, 14), the levels of incongruence in each trial were randomized. 
However, the pattern of the fluctuation of rewards is identical across the conditions (see 
Figure 5.1), and so any biases resulting from this pattern are constant between conditions. 
 






















Debriefing – After the experiment, the subjects were debriefed to ensure that they 
understood fully all instructions and had no suspicions of the manipulation or the 
deception. The subjects were also informed of the overall purpose of this research, the 
hypotheses being tested, and so on. Before leaving, they were paid $10 in cash, regardless 
of their performance in the experiment. 
 
5.3 MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSES 
 
Measurement – Three sets of dependent variables were measured in this experiment: 
justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and behavior l responses. To measure justice 
evaluations, the questionnaire asked about subjects’ evaluations of the reward from their 
group after each exchange session. They evaluated their overall reward level using a 10-
point Likert scale, with anchors of just/unjust (Molm et al. 2003). Emotional distress 
measures how strongly subjects feel various positive or negative emotions about their 
payment (e.g., anger, disappointment, and resentment). These items were also measured 
with 10-point Likert scales (α=.77 in a previous study; Hegtvedt and Killian 1999). Along 
with negative emotions, the subjects’ level of satisf ction was also measured.  
Cooperation levels are a critical part of the endogenous process predicted in the 
theory. This was measured in two ways. First, to asses  cooperation levels directly, 
subjects’ investments of their resources in the group were measured. Second, subjects 
were asked how much they would like to stay in their exchange network if offered to 
move to another exchange network that ensures higher profit. Staying behavior is a 
previously used indicator of commitment to the group (Lawler et al. 2008). 
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Analyses – The experiment consisted of 14 trials and measured th  changes in 
individuals’ reactions based on fluctuation of rewards over trials. Since an array of trials 
is nested in each subject, I use a multi-level model for the analyses. Using an individual 
growth model (Singer 1998), the analyses decompose fixed and random effects using a 
maximum-likelihood estimator. To specify the statistical model, which estimates the 
effect of reward stability on justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and group 
cooperation, I compare multiple empirical models using tests of nested models and 
goodness-of-fit indices, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Appendix D). 
Then I estimate a statistical model with which to make inferences based on the preferred 
model specification. 
 
5.4 RESULTS  
 
The analyses reports data from 90 participants. A total of 109 participants were recruited 
in the experiment and 19 were excluded from the analyses for reporting being suspicious 
or not understanding the manipulations. The participants were randomly distributed 
across the three conditions. Each condition has 30 participants, and each participant 
completed 14 rounds in the experiment, making a total sample of 1,260 participant-
rounds.  
  Univariate Statistics – Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
control variables. Subjects’ gender, age, race, and school year in college were measured 




Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Participants’ Demographics 
Variable 
# of  
Participants 
# of  
Observations 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Female 90 1260 .500 – 0 1 
Age 90 1260 19.856 1.603 17 28 
White 90 1260 .778 – 0 1 
College Year 90 1260 2.356 1.149 1 5 
 
American, Hispanic, Asian, and other. Since the majority of participants were white 
(77.8%), race was recoded into a dichotomous variable using “white” and “non-white.”  
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 present the descriptive statistics of the justice evaluations, the 
four emotional responses, and the two behavioral reactions, respectively. All the 
indicators were measured in 10-points Likert scales. These tables also offer the basic 
statistics of the measurements across the conditions. The tables show that the level of 
justice evaluations is highest in the control condition, followed by the low-instability 
condition, and then by the high-instability condition. Emotional responses show the same 
patterns: negative emotion is the highest in the high-instability condition, followed by the 
low-instability condition and then by the control cndition. When it comes to positive 
emotion, the level of satisfaction is highest in the control condition and lowest in the 
high-instability condition. Behavioral reactions show a pattern similar to the previous 
measurements: the level of cooperation measured in investments to the group and 












Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Justice Evaluation  90 1260 6.350 3.025 1 10 
    High-Instability 30 420 5.912 3.347 1 10 
    Low-Instability 30 420 6.176 3.180 1 10 
    Control 30 420 6.962 2.364 1 10 
 









Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Anger 90 1260 3.749 2.986 1 10 
    High-Instability 30 420 4.412 3.310 1 10 
    Low-Instability 30 420 3.688 3.034 1 10 
    Control 30 420 3.148 2.414 1 10 
Disappointment  90 420 4.075 3.138 1 10 
    High-Instability 30 420 4.617 3.412 1 10 
    Low-Instability 30 420 4.202 3.226 1 10 
    Control 30 420 3.405 2.602 1 10 
Resentment 90 420 3.662 2.908 1 10 
    High-Instability 30 420 4.136 3.181 1 10 
    Low-Instability 30 420 3.602 2.935 1 10 
    Control 30 420 3.248 2.505 1 10 
Satisfaction 90 1260 6.202 3.159 1 10 
    No-Instability  30 420 6.824 2.648 1 10 
    Low-Instability 30 420 6.133 3.256 1 10 
    High-Instability 30 420 5.648 3.417 1 10 
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Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Investment  90 1260 364.615 121.238 0 500 
    High-Instability 30 420 336.243 132.579 0 500 
    Low-Instability 30 420 354.645 116.853 0 500 
    Control 30 420 402.957 102.734 70 500 
Staying Behavior 90 420 6.141 3.199 1 10 
    No-Instability  30 420 6.536 3.020 1 10 
    Low-Instability 30 420 6.517 3.306 1 10 
    High-Instability 30 420 5.371 3.132 1 10 
 
Justice Evaluations – The main argument of this dissertation is that te instability 
of rewards decreases justice evaluations among group members. Figure 5.2 presents a 
trend of the means of justice evaluations over trials with confidence intervals in each 
condition. As seen, levels of justice evaluations exactly follow the fluctuations of reward 
manipulations described in Figure 5.1.  
A global F-test reveals a significant effect of thereward stability on the level of 
justice evaluations (F(2, 87) = 3.78, p = .027) (Table 5.5). The result also shows that the 
variation of the actual reward level (a level of manipulations) has a significant effect on 




Figure 5.2 Justice Evaluation over Trials in Each Condition 
 
Table 5.5 Test of Fixed Effects on Justice Evaluation 
 F-value p-value 
Condition (F2, 87) 3.78 .027 
Reward Level (F1, 87) 52.43 < .001 











Table 5.6 Comparisons of the Level of Justice Evaluation1, 2 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-value p-value 
Condition3 
High-Instability –.8171 .2976 –2.75 .002 
Low-Instability –.4458 .2976 –1.50 .069 
Reward Level   .4305 .0753 5.72 < .001 
1 1 – “not just at all,” 10 – “very just” 
2 This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition. 
3 Control condition is the reference category 
The parameter estimates for the fixed effects (Table 5.6) show that the justice 
evaluations in the experimental conditions are lower than the justice evaluations in the 
control condition (low-instability condition, t(86) = –1.50, one-tailed, p = .069; high-
instability condition, t (86)= –2.75, one-tailed, p = .002). The results also show that the 
actual reward level is positively related to justice evaluations: the higher the actual 
rewards compared with expected rewards, the higher the perceived justice evaluations (t 
(86) = 5.72, one-tailed, p < .001). The results support Hypothesis 1 which predicts a 
positive relationship between the stability of rewards and justice evaluations. 
To determine the effect of reward level on justice evaluations, I compared the 
justice evaluations in each of the unjust reward trials with the justice evaluations in the 
just reward trials (Table 5.7). The result shows that e reward level is positively related 
to justice evaluations among the under-reward trials (under-rewarded by 1~50%). 
However, in the over-reward trials (over-rewarded by 1~50%), the effect of the reward 
manipulations is not significantly related to justice evaluations. That is, the effect of an 






Table 5.7 Comparison of Justice Evaluations across Manipulation Levels 
Reward Level (%) ∆ in Est. Means Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Under-rewards 
–50 –5.718 .358 –15.98 < .001 
–40 –5.329 .328 –16.23 < .001 
–30 –4.634 .279 –16.64 < .001 
–20 –4.742 .292 –16.26 < .001 
–10 –3.324 .277 –12.02 < .001 
Control 
–3 –2.655 .395 –6.72 < .001 
–2 –2.484 .373 –6.66 < .001 
–1 –1.697 .335 –5.07 < .001 
1 .356 .325 1.09 .277 
2 –.334 .368 –.91 .367 
3 –.134 .384 –.35 .728 
Over-rewards 
10 .112 .281 .40 .690 
20 .324 .303 1.07 .288 
30 .472 .269 1.76 .082 
40 .045 .334 .13 .893 
50 .016 .354 .05 .963 
 
This confirms the asymmetry between under-rewards an  over-rewards. This 
result also shows that even a very small amount of instability (1~3%) affects justice 
evaluations. 
Emotional Reactions –The second hypothesis predicts a positive relationship 
between the instability of rewards and negative emotions. To test the hypothesis, 
emotional reactions are measured along four dimensions: anger, disappointment, 
resentment, and satisfaction.  
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Anger: Anger is the one of the main emotions that accompanies unjust rewards 
(Dalbert 2002). An omnibus model test from a multi-level model shows that the fixed 
effect of condition (F(2, 87) = 7.17, p = .001) and reward level (F(1, 87) = 72.83, p < .001) 
are significantly related to anger (Table 5.8). The parameter estimates for the fixed 
effects (Table 5.9) show that there are significant differences between the control 
condition and the high-instability condition. Anger is higher in the high-instability 
condition than in the control condition (t(86) = 3.26, one-tailed, p = .002). Actual reward 
level shows a negative effect on anger (t(86) = –7.08, one-tailed, p < .001). The results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 5.8 Test of Fixed Effects on Anger 
 F-value p-value 
Condition (F2, 87) 7.17 .001 
Reward Level (F1, 87) 72.83 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 998.01 < .001 
 
Table 5.9 Comparisons of the Level of Anger1, 2 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Condition3 
High-Instability .9031 .2766 3.26 < .001 
Low-Instability –.0292 .2661 –0.11 .456 
Reward Level   –.3464 .0489 –7.08 < .001 
1 1 – “not angry at all,” 10 – “very angry” 
2 This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition. 
3 Control condition is the reference category. 
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Disappointment: An omnibus F-test from a multi-level model reveals a significant 
effect of condition (F(2, 87) = 11.63, p <.001) and reward level (F(1, 87) = 95.13, p < .001) 
on the level of disappointment (Table 5.10) on disappointment. The parameter estimates 
for the fixed effects (Table 5.11) show significant differences between the control 
condition and the experimental conditions. Among the three conditions, disappointment 
is highest in the high-instability condition (t(86) = 4.76, one-tailed, p < .001), followed by 
the low-instability condition (t(86) = 1.56, one-tailed, p = .062). Actual reward level also 
shows a negative effect on disappointment (t(86) = –7.67, one-tailed, p < .001).  
 
Table 5.10 Test of Fixed Effects on Disappointment 
 F-value p-value 
Condition (F2, 87) 11.63 .001 
Reward Level (F1, 87) 95.13 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 887.89 < .001 
 
Table 5.11 Comparisons of the Level of Disappointment1, 2 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Condition3 
High-Instability 1.2847 .2701 4.76 < .001 
Low-Instability .3990 .2565 1.56 .062 
Reward Level   –.3937 .0513 –7.67 < .001 
1 1 – “not disappointed,” 10 – “very disappointed” 
2 This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition. 
3 Control condition is the reference category 
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Resentment: The last negative emotion measured in this experiment is resentment. 
An omnibus F-test from a multi-level model reveals  ignificant difference in resentment 
between conditions (F(2, 87) = 4.20, p =.002) and reward levels (F(1, 87) = 27.95, p <.001) 
(Table 5.12). The parameter estimates for the fixed effects (Table 5.13) show that there 
are significant differences between the control condition and the high-instability 
condition (t(86) = 2.60, one-tailed, p = .005). Actual reward level shows a negative effect 
on disappointment (t(86) = –4.33, one-tailed, p < .001).  
 
Table 5.12 Test of Fixed Effects on Resentment 
 F-value p-value 
Condition (F2, 87) 4.20 .002 
Reward Level (F1, 87) 27.95 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 967.91 < .001 
 
Table 5.13 Comparisons of the Level of Resentment1, 2 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Condition3 
High-Instability .8735 .3363 2.60 .005 
Low-Instability .0391 .3232 .12 .452 
Reward Level   –.2826 .0653 –4.33 < .001 
1 1 – “not resentful,” 10 – “very resentful” 
2 This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition. 
3 Control condition is the reference category 
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Satisfaction: Satisfaction is the only positive emotion measured in the experiment. 
An omnibus F-test from a multi-level model shows that there are statistically significant 
differences among the conditions (F(2, 87) = 9.51, p < .001) and the effect of actual reward 
manipulation (F(1, 87) = 145.39, p < .001) (Table 5.14). The parameter estimates for the 
fixed effects (Table 5.15) show that there are significant differences between the control 
condition and the experimental conditions. Satisfaction in the high-instability condition 
(t(86) = –4.25, one-tailed, p < .001) and the low-instability condition (t(86) = –2.97, one-
tailed, p = .002) are significantly lower than the satisfaction level in the control condition. 
Actual reward level shows a positive effect; that is, the higher the actual reward the  
 
Table 5.14 Test of Fixed Effects on Satisfaction 
 F-value p-value 
Condition (F2, 87) 9.51 < .001 
Reward Level (F1, 87) 145.39 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 754.90 < .001 
 
Table 5.15 Comparisons of the Level of Satisfaction1, 2 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Condition3 
High-Instability –1.0602 .2495 –4.25 < .001 
Low-Instability –  .7367 .2482 –2.97 .002 
Reward Level   .4859 .0518 9.38 < .001 
1 1 – “not satisfied,” 10 – “very satisfied” 
2 This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition. 
3 Control condition is the reference category 
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higher the satisfaction level (t(86) = 9.38, one-tailed, p < .001).  
The results from the analyses of the effect of the instability of rewards on four 
emotional reactions reveal that individuals are more likely to feel negative emotions, such 
as anger, disappointment, and resentment when their rewards are unstable. At the same 
time, the instability of rewards also decreases positive emotions. Moreover the intensity 
of emotional reactions is proportionate to actual reward levels. Overall, the results 
confirm that the instability of rewards produces emotional distress and decreases positive 
emotions among the individuals in a group. Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Behavioral Reactions – Hypothesis 3 predicts that unstable rewards decreases 
group cooperation. In this experiment, group cooperation is measured in two ways: the 
level of investments to the group, and the willingness to stay in the current relationship 
despite better alternatives. 
Investment: Investments were measured by participants’ decisions of how much 
they wanted to invest in their company on each experimental round.6 An omnibus F-test 
from a multi-level model shows that investments are influenced by both condition (F(2, 80) 
= 6.14, p = .003) and trial (F(13, 80) = 6.75, p < .001) (Table 5.16). A multi-level model 
which estimates the effects of condition, trials and their interaction, along with the 
controls, offers a comparison of investments between conditions. The results show that 
investments are significantly higher in the control c ndition than the low-instability 
condition (t(80) = –2.83, one-tailed, p = .006) and high-instability condition (t(80) = –3.20, 
one-tailed, p = .002) (Table 5.17) 
                                                           
6 Comparisons between mixed models shows that “trial” explains investments better than 
“reward level.” Thus, I included “trial” instead of“reward-level” to specify a multi-level 
model (see Appendix D for the specification of this model). 
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Table 5.16 Test of Fixed Effects on Investment 
 F-value p-value 
Female (F1, 80) 6.26 .015 
Age (F1, 80) .16 .689 
White (F1, 80) 5.14 .026 
Year (F1, 80) 2.98 .024 
Condition (F2, 80) 6.14 .003 
Trial (F13, 80) 6.75 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 598.98 < .001 
  
Table 5.17 Comparisons of the Level of Investment1 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Condition2 
High-Instability –61.0881 19.2900 –3.20 .002 
Low-Instability –55.0551 19.4496 –2.83 .006 
1 Ranged from 0 to 500  
2 Control condition is the reference category 
Staying: The willingness to stay in the current exchange relationship despite 
better alternatives is another indicator of the leve  of group cooperation. It was measured 
in a 10-point Likert scale which ranges from 1- “definitely move to other company” to 10 
– “definitely stay in the current company.” An omnibus F-test from multi-level model 
shows that condition (F(2, 83) = 5.67, p = .005) and actual reward level (F(1, 83) = 18.72, p < 




Table 5.18 Test of Fixed Effects on Staying Behavior 
 F-value p-value 
Female (F1, 83) .21 .647 
Age (F1, 83) .40 .528 
White (F1, 83) 7.10 .009 
Year (F1, 83) .02 .896 
Condition (F2, 83) 5.67 .005 
Reward Level (F1, 83) 18.72 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 1324.50 < .001 
 
Table 5.19 Comparisons of Staying Behaviors1, 2 
Effect Condition Estimate Std. Err. t-Value p-Value 
Condition3 
High-Instability –1.3757 .5070 –2.71 .004 
Low-Instability –1.5355 .4995 –3.07 .002 
Reward Level   .2328 .0624 3.73 < .001 
1 1 – “definitely move,” 10 – “definitely not move” 
2 This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition. 
3 Control condition is the reference category 
variables, race influences staying behavior: white people are more likely to stay in current 
exchange relations than are non-whites.  
The parameter estimates for the fixed effects (Table 5.18) show that there are 
significant differences between the control condition and the experimental conditions in 
willingness to stay in the current group. The level of willingness to stay in the high-
instability condition (t(86) = –2.71, one-tailed, p = .004) and the low-instability condition 
76 
 
(t(86) = –3.07, one-tailed, p = .002) is significantly lower than the control conditions. 
There is also a positive effect of actual reward on an individual’s willingness to stay (t(86) 
= 3.73, one-tailed, p < .001).  
This experiment shows that the stability of rewards f om groups is positively 
related to group cooperation among individuals. Based on these results, I conclude that 
Hypothesis 3 is supported by this experiment. The effect of instability on group 
cooperation is highly significant both in terms of investment levels and in terms of 




In this chapter I described a controlled laboratory experiment which tested the predicted 
relationships among variables as described in Chapter 3. The theory predicts that the 
instability of rewards decreases justice evaluations, increases emotional distress, and 
decreases the willingness of group members to cooperate. The results from a controlled 
laboratory experiment with three conditions clearly nd consistently support the 
hypotheses derived from the theory. As expected, the s ability of rewards is positively 
related to justice evaluations and to positive emotional reactions, which are measured 
along four different dimensions (anger, disappointment, resentment, and satisfaction) 
among the group members. Furthermore, the stability of rewards leads individuals to 
higher cooperation levels: the more stable the rewads from the group, the more likely the 
individuals are to invest their resources and to stay in the current group, even though 
better profits are available from other groups.  
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The theory assumes that the negative effect of reward instability on justice 
evaluations comes from an asymmetry between unjust rewards in opposite directions 
(e.g., Austin and Walster 1974). The results from the experiment reveal that justice 
evaluations in all under-reward trials are significantly lower than the justice evaluations 
in the just-reward trials, while justice evaluations i  all the over-reward conditions are not 
significantly different from justice evaluations in just-reward trials. In other words, 
although under-rewards reduce justice evaluations among people, the same extent of 
over-rewards cannot cancel out the effect of under-rewards. This confirms the assumption 
of asymmetry between under-rewards and over-rewards. 
It is also noteworthy to see the strength of the eff ct of unstable rewards on the 
justice evaluations of the control condition. Theoretically, the control condition was 
supposed to have no fluctuations of rewards over time. However, to create a more 
realistic experiment, I implemented a very small amount of instability in the control 
condition (1~3%) compared with the low-instability (10~30%) and high-instability 
(30~50%) conditions. I expected that the effect of instability between 1% and 3% would 
have almost no effect on justice evaluations. However, the results show that even such a 
small amount of instability lowers justice evaluations. This demonstrates how powerful 
the effect of unstable rewards on justice evaluations can be. 
In sum, the experiment presented in this chapter tests he main arguments of the 
theory introduced in this dissertation. The results consistently and clearly support the 
hypotheses directly derived from the theory. The results also reveal the asymmetry 
between under-rewards and over-rewards in justice processes and show the influence of 
the instability of rewards. The next chapter introduces another controlled laboratory 
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experiment that aims to replicate the results of this c apter and to test for possible order 




EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE INSTABILITY OF 
REWARDS 
 
The results in Chapter 5 demonstrate the influence of the stability of rewards on group 
cooperation via the asymmetrical effects of unjust rewards on justice evaluations. The 
results also revealed that the instability of rewards increases emotional distress among 
individuals. As an extension to that experiment, in h s chapter, I discuss a test for the 
moderating effects of the “presentation order” of unstable rewards on justice evaluations.  
There are two objectives of this study. First, it aims to replicate the results of the 
first experiment. The main purpose of this dissertation is to introduce a theory explaining 
the effect of reward stability on justice evaluations which has never been tested 
empirically before. Unlike the previous experiment, the control condition of this 
experiment does not implement any fluctuations in the level of rewards. Therefore, the 
control condition of this experiment shows the baseline of the justice evaluations and 
contrasts the effect of the instability of rewards more clearly. The second objective of this 
experiment is to show the effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards. To do this, 
I conducted another controlled laboratory experiment with five conditions that presents 
the instability of rewards in different orders. Previous research showed that the order in 
which people experience events shapes their judgments ( .g. Murdock 1962). There have 
been two lines of research on the effect of the presentation order. Research on the 
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primacy effect maintains that information presented first has a stronger effect on 
judgments and is more likely to change individuals’ judgments than information that is 
presented last (Forgas 2011; Lund 1925). On the othr hand, other researchers have found 
a recency effect, which suggests that information presented last has a stronger effect than 
the information that is presented first (Furnham 1986; Panagopoulos 2011). Though both 
the primacy effect and the recency effect show the power of serial positioning effects, the 
evidence is contradictory. 
Prospect theory explains the role of an initial refe nce point and an anchor in 
individual’s judgments. The endowment effect explains that individuals value the goods 
that they already possess more and evaluate the goods of others to be less valuable 
(Thaler 1980). For example, Kahneman and his colleagu s (1990) showed that people 
who already possessed a mug were willing to sell it for around $7, while people who did 
not possess a mug were willing to pay only around $3 to buy the same one. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974, 1981) also found an anchoring effect on judgments, which explains 
that variation of the reference point of judgments can change the evaluations of gains and 
losses. The theory suggests that a starting point and a variation of the reference point over 
time play an important role in producing evaluations among individuals. 
Markovsky (1988a) demonstrated that justice evaluations are shaped by social 
contexts or framing information. Based on the results from five vignette experiments, he 
showed that justice evaluations could be biased either toward (assimilation effect) or 
away from (contrast effect) the anchor when the anchor is salient in the situation. 
Furthermore, the study shows that the information presented first can serve as an anchor 
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for the information that follows. Markovsky’s research suggests that the order of 
evaluations.  
Based on previous research, here I assume that the order of the stability (or 
instability) of rewards also has a net effect on justice evaluations. If justice evaluations 
are affected more strongly by the reward events that come first (primacy effect), the 
instability of rewards at an early time point will have a stronger effect on justice 
evaluations than unstable rewards of the same degree which come later. By contrast, if 
reward events experienced more recently affect justice evaluations more strongly 
(recency effect), the instability of rewards that come later will have a stronger effect on 
the justice processes than unstable rewards of the sam  degree presented at an early stage.  
If the presentation order of rewards affects justice evaluations, the presentation 
order between under-rewards and over-rewards will cause bias in evaluating justice of 
rewards. The experiment in Chapter 5 shows that an under-reward has a stronger effect 
that an over-reward of the same size. Based on the result, it is predicted that if the 
primacy effect is prominent, the justice evaluations will be lower when under-rewards 
appear prior to over-rewards than when over-rewards ppear first and are followed by the 
same size of under-rewards. By contrast, if the recncy effect is stronger than the primacy 
effect in an unstable rewards situation, the justice evaluations will be lower if over-
rewards appear prior to under-rewards. In this experiment I predict a primacy effect will 
be salient for justice evaluations and that the rewa ds presented earlier will have a 
stronger effect than the reward presented later. Therefore, the justice evaluations will be 
lower in the primacy conditions (conditions 1 and 2) compared to the recency conditions 
(conditions 3 and 4). Also, the justice evaluations in under reward first conditions 
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(conditions 1 and 3) will be lower compared to the ov r-reward first conditions 




The main purpose of this experiment is to test the effect of presentation order under the 
unstable reward situation. This study tests hypotheses expecting primacy effects which 
explains that the information or events come earlier ar  more influential than those 
presented later on individuals’ judgments. Therefor, the hypotheses state that:  
Hypothesis 1 (Primacy effect) (H1): The negative eff ct of unstable rewards on 
justice evaluation is stronger when they appear earli r.  
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The effect of the instability of rewards on justice evaluation 
is stronger when unstable rewards appear earlier than stable rewards.  
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): The effect of the instability of rewards on justice evaluation 
is stronger when under-rewards appear earlier than over-rewards.  
The other purpose of this study is to confirm the results from the previous chapter. Since 
the effect of the instability of rewards has never b en tested empirically, it is necessary to 
test the effect in multiple experiments to confirm the effectiveness of the theory. 
Therefore, this experiment tests the same hypothesis as in the previous chapter: that 
stability of rewards is positively related to justice evaluations.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The stability of the reward struc ure is positively related to 
justice evaluations. 
In addition to testing the hypothesis from the previous experiment in Chapter 5, 
In addition, this study aims to replicate the results from the previous studies.  
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6.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Most of the procedures, including the cover story, f this experiment were the same as 
the procedures in the previous experiment, except for the stability manipulation schedule, 
the number of conditions, and the number of rounds. This experiment manipulated the 
instability of rewards in two ways (2 × 2): the orde  of unstable reward (primacy vs. 
recency) and the order of incongruence (under-reward first vs. over-reward first). To 
establish a baseline of justice evaluations, I added a control condition which does not 
include any incongruence of rewards throughout the experiment. There is, therefore, a 
total of five conditions. Each condition consisted of 18 rounds. There were four more 
rounds per condition than in the previous experiment, a d the rounds were divided evenly 
into three sub-phases as explained in the next section. 
Stability Manipulation – The experiment was a 2 × 2 design that crossed the 
presentation order of unstable rewards and the presentation order of unjust rewards. In the 
primacy conditions (conditions 1 and 2), twelve unstable rewards were presented first and 
followed by six stable rewards (Figure 6.1). Whereas, in the recency conditions 
(conditions 3 and 4), stable rewards appeared in the first six rounds and unstable rewards 
were presented in the next twelve rounds (Figure 6.2). In the unstable reward rounds, the 
rewards from the group deviated from the expected rewa d level by between 10-30%. 
Each of the primacy conditions and recency conditions consisted of two sub-
conditions: an under-reward-first condition and an over-reward-first condition. In the 
under-reward-first condition, rewards from the first six rounds among the twelve unstable 
reward rounds were lower than the expected level, and the rewards fluctuated bove the 
expected level in the following six rounds. On the other hand, in the over-reward-first 
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condition, the rewards fluctuated above the expected level in the first six rounds among 
the twelve unstable reward rounds, and followed by six rounds in which the rewards 
fluctuated below the expected level. In addition to four experimental conditions, there 
was a control condition in which the rewards from the group were stable throughout the 
experiment. 
In respect of the hypothesis, H1a predicts that the justice evaluations in the 
primacy conditions will be lower than the justice evaluations in the recency conditions 
(conditions 1 and 2 < conditions 3 and 4). In addition, H1b predicts that the justice 
evaluations in the under-reward-first conditions will be lower than the justice evaluations 
in the over-reward-first conditions (conditions 1 and 3 < conditions 2 and 4). When it 
comes to the presentation order effect, H3 predicts that justice evaluations in the control 
condition (condition 5) will be higher than the justice evaluations in the other four 
experimental conditions (conditions 1–4). 
Measurement – To test the hypotheses, which are stated above, this experiment 
measured justice evaluations with a 10-point Likert scale after each investment 
opportunity. In addition, subjects’ gender, age, race, and school year in college were 
measured as control variables. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Manipulation Schedule of the Primacy Condition
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6.3 RESULTS  
 
 
The analyses reports data from 150 participants. A otal of 164 participants were recruited 
in the experiment and 14 were excluded from the analyses for reporting being suspicious 
or not understanding the manipulations. The participants were randomly distributed 
across the five conditions. Each condition has 30 participants, and each participant 
completed 18 rounds in the experiment, making a total sample of 2,700 participant-
rounds. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables. As in the 
previous experiment, subjects’ gender, age, race, and year in college were measured.  
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Participants’ Demographics 
Variable 
# of  
Participants 
# of  
Observations 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Female 150 2700 .500 – 0 1 
Age 150 2700 20.407 2.167 17 34 
White 150 2700 .640 – 0 1 
College Year 150 2700 2.533 1.094 1 5 
 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of justice evaluations. Consistent with 
H2, justice evaluations are higher in the control condition than the experimental 
conditions. In regards to the experimental conditions, the recency conditions show a 
higher justice evaluation compared to the primacy conditions. Figure 6.3 plots a trend of 
the means of justice evaluations over trials with confidence intervals in each condition. 








# of Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Total 150 2700 7.642 2.902 1 10 
Primacy 
Subtotal 60 1080 7.146 2.990 1 10 
condition 1 30 540 7.467 2.996 1 10 
condition 2 30 540 6.824 2.951 1 10 
Recency 
Subtotal 60 1080 7.475 3.048 1 10 
condition 3  30 540 7.215 2.961 1 10 
condition 4 30 540 7.735 3.112 1 10 











In particular, the justice evaluations in under-rewards trials exactly follow the 
manipulation schedule. However, it shows that the diff rences of justice evaluations 
between just-rewards and over-reward trials are not as large as the differences of justice 
evaluations between just-rewards and under-rewards trial . 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the asymmetric tendency more clearly. According 
to the results from the comparison of the justice evaluations across different reward 
levels, under-rewards have a negative effect on justice evaluations (–5.338 ~ –3.367) 
while over-rewards have a positive effect on justice evaluations (+.275 ~ +.608). 
However, the differences of the justice evaluations from the just-reward trials are larger 
in the under-rewards trials compared with the over-rewards conditions. Figure 6.4 shows 
the asymmetries in justice evaluations across the different reward levels. 
 
Table 6.3 Comparison of Justice Evaluations across Manipulation Levels 
Reward Level (%) Est. Means Std. Err. ∆ of Means1 t-Value p-Value 
Under-rewards 
–30 3.329 .140 –5.388 –32.51 < .001 
–20 4.656 .139 –4.060 –24.86 < .001 
–10 5.349 .141 –3.367 –21.35 < .001 
Just-rewards 0 8.716 .114    
Over-rewards 
10 8.991 .141 .275 1.74 .042 
20 9.271 .139 .555 3.40 .001 
30 9.324 .140 .608 3.67 < .001 




Figure 6.4 Justice Evaluations across the Level of Rewards 
To test the hypotheses, a multi-level model with trials nested in participants was 
used (see Appendix D for the model specifications). First, I tested H1 which argued for 
primacy effects of the unstable rewards on justice evaluations. To test the hypothesis, I 
specified the effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards (primacy vs recency), 
the presentation order of unjust rewards (under-rewa ds-first vs. over-reward-first), and 
the interaction effect of the two manipulations. An omnibus test from the multi-level 
model reveals a significant effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards (F(1, 145) = 
22.96, p < .001) and the presentation order of unjust rewards (F(1, 145) = 8.27, p = .005) on 
justice evaluations. The results also reveal a significa t interaction between 
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Table 6.4 Test of Fixed Effects on Justice Evaluation 
 F-value p-value 
Recency effect (F1, 116)
1 22.96 < .001 
Over-Rewards-First effect (F1, 116)
2 8.27 .005 





Chi2 (170) 2498.4 < .001 
1 Primacy condition is the reference condition 
2 Under-reward-first condition is the reference condition  
 
Comparisons among conditions show that the estimated justice evaluations are 
higher in the recency conditions (conditions 3 and 4) (M = 7.555) than the primacy 
conditions (condition 1 and 2) (M = 6.671) and the difference is statistically significant 
(t(116)= –4.79, two-tailed, p < .001) (Table 6.5). That is, unstable rewards have a stronger 
negative effect on justice evaluations when they appe r earlier in a series of rewards than 
when they appear later. Therefore, the results support H1a.  
 
Table 6.5 Justice Evaluation of the Primacy Conditions and the Recency Conditions  
Condition Est. Means  Std. Err. ∆ of Means1 t-value p-value 
Primacy conditions 6.671 .130 
.884 4.79 < .001 
Recency conditions 7.555 .130 




Table 6.6 Justice Evaluation of the Under-reward-fist conditions and Over-reward-first 
conditions 
 




.530 2.88  .005 
Over-reward first  
conditions 
7.379 .130 
1 The under-reward-first conditions are the reference category.  
To test H1b, I compared the justice evaluations in under-reward-first conditions 
(conditions 1 and 3) to over-reward-first conditions (conditions 2 and 4). The result 
shows that the over-reward-first conditions have higher justice evaluations (M = 7.379) 
than the under-reward-first conditions (M = 6.848) and the difference is also statistically 
significant (t(116)= –2.88, two-tailed, p = .005) (Table 6.6). The result supports the H1b. In 
sum, the results from the analyses support H1. This results suggest that unstable rewards 
have a stronger negative effect when they are present d in an earlier stage of a reward 
sequence. It also indicates that unstable rewards have a stronger effect when under-
rewards come first than when over-rewards come first.
The results of the omnibus test presented in Table 6.4 show that the interaction 
between the presentation order of unstable rewards an  the presentation order of unjust 
rewards is significant. Table 6.7 presents the main and interaction effects of the 
manipulations on justice evaluations. The coefficients confirm that the recency 
manipulation and over-reward-first manipulation have positive effects on justice 
evaluations, as stated above. It also reveals that the recency manipulation (β = 1.333) has 
a stronger effect than the over-reward-first manipulation (β = .980). When it comes to the 




Table 6.7 Estimated Fixed Effects of the Manipulations and the Interaction 
 β Std. Err. t- value p-value 
Interception 8.045 .184 43.63 < .001 
Recency effect1 1.333 .261 5.11 < .001 
Over-Rewards-First effect2 .980 .261 3.76 .003 
Recency × Over-Rewards First  .898 .369 2.44 .016 
1 The primacy conditions are the reference category. 
2 The under-reward first conditions are the reference category. 
(β = .898). This suggests that the effect of over-rewad-first manipulation is stronger in 
the recency effect conditions than in the primacy effect conditions. 
Table 6.8 presents the justice evaluations for each xperimental condition. 
Consistent with Table 6.7, justice evaluations are highest in condition 4 (M = 8.045) and 
second highest in condition 3 (M = 7.066). Between the primacy conditions, condition 2 
(M = 6.712) shows higher justice evaluations than condition 1 (M = 6.631).  
 
Table 6.8 Estimated Means of Justice Evaluations across the Conditions  
Condition Est. Means  Std. Err. 
Primacy 
condition 1 6.631 .184 
condition 2 6.712 .184 
Recency 
condition 3 7.066 .184 
condition 4 8.045 .184 
  
Lastly, I tested H2, which hypothesized the negative effect of the instability of 
rewards on justice evaluations to replicate the result of the previous experiment. To do 
this the justice evaluations between the experimental conditions and the control 
conditions are compared. An omnibus test from the multi-level model reveals a  
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Table 6.9 Test of Fixed Effects on Justice Evaluation 
 F-value p-value 
Condition (F1, 148) 77.58 < .001 





Chi2 (104) 2026.77 < .001 
 
significant effect of condition (F(1, 148) = 77.58, p < .001) and reward level (F(1, 148) = 
850.15, p < .001) on justice evaluations (Table 6.7) (see Appendix D for the model 
specifications). 
A comparison between the control condition and the experimental conditions 
reveals that the control condition shows higher justice evaluations than the experimental 
conditions and the difference is statistically significant (t(116)= –8.81, two-tailed, p < .001 
) (Table 6.8). This shows that the stability of rewards has a positive effect on justice 
evaluations and supports H2. 
 
Table 6.10 Justice Evaluation of the Experimental conditions and Control condition 
Condition Est. Means  Std. Err. ∆ of Means1 t-value p-value 
Experimental conditions 7.145 .100 
–1.967 –8.81 < .001 
Control condition 9.113 .200 






In this chapter, I introduced another experiment tha ests the hypothesis supported in the 
previous experiment. The hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the 
stability of rewards and justice evaluations. The results from this experiment supported 
the hypothesis again. Consistent with the results from the previous experiment in Chapter 
5, the current experiment showed that stable rewards re associated with a higher justice 
evaluations. Though the current experimental study di  not report the emotional and 
behavioral responses resulting from the instability of rewards, the same consequences 
were expected based on the results from the previous experiment. 
The results of the current experiment also confirmed th  asymmetric effects 
between under-rewards and over-rewards. The theory presented in this dissertation 
assumes that the negative effect of the instability of rewards on justice evaluations comes 
from the asymmetry of unjust rewards (under-reward is worse than over-reward). 
Different from the previous experiment, the control c ndition of this experiment had no 
instability at all. This design allowed us to check the baseline of the justice evaluations 
and to test the net effect of the instability of reward on justice. The results showed that 
the effect of under-rewards is stronger than the eff ct of the same size of over-rewards.  
The results also showed the effect of over-rewards on justice evaluations. Earlier 
research on justice theory has argued that not only under-rewards but also over-rewards 
reduce justice evaluations (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974; Homans 1961). However, other 
empirical studies found a logarithmic function betwen reward levels and justice 
evaluations (Jasso 1980; Markovsky 1985). In those studies, over-rewards increase, not 
decrease justice evaluations, though the steepness decreases as the extent of over-rewards 
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gets larger. The results from this experiment confirm the findings from the studies that 
showed over-reward is positively related to justice evaluations, though the effect is not as 
strong as under-reward. 
Another objective of the experiment presented in this c apter is to examine the 
effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards on justice evaluations. Between the 
competing predictions associated with primacy effects and recency effects, this 
experiment supported the primacy effect of the instabili y of rewards. The results showed 
that the negative effect of unstable rewards is more salient when the unstable rewards are 
presented earlier than stable rewards than vice versa. Furthermore, the results confirmed 
the effect of the presentation order of unjust rewards on justice evaluations: unstable 
rewards have a stronger effect when under-rewards are presented prior to over-rewards 
than vice versa. 
In brief, the second experiment of this dissertation c nfirmed the results from 
experiment 1 and consistently supported the theory presented in Chapter 3. It also showed 
the asymmetrical effects between under-reward and over-reward in terms of the 
directions, as well as the intensity. The experiment also revealed that the effect of the 
instability of rewards on justice evaluations varies according to the presentation order of 
the instability of rewards. Between the two serial positioning effects: primacy effects and 
recency effects, the results supported the primacy effects hypothesis by showing that the 







This dissertation introduces a new theory of reward stability, justice evaluations and 
group cooperation, and also provides empirical evidence for the theory. In establishing 
the theory, I combined justice theory, prospect theory, and the notion of negativity bias 
from cognitive psychology. Integrating theoretical b ckgrounds from previous research, 
this dissertation investigates the judgmental, emotional, and behavioral consequences of 
unstable rewards in repeated exchange relations. In doing this, I introduced a set of novel 
theoretical assumptions that postulate the effect of the stability of rewards on justice 
evaluations and cooperation. The results from three empirical studies demonstrated the 
effectiveness of this theory, both in the lab and in the “real world.” 
Justice has been described as “the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1971: 
p. 2), and scholars have addressed justice problems for a long time (Solomon and Murphy 
2000). Over the last five decades since the seminal studies of modern justice theory 
(Adams 1963; Homans 1961), researchers from various disciplines have investigated the 
factors and consequences of justice evaluations (see Jost and Kay 2010 for a review). 
Distributive justice theory underpins this dissertation with a wide range of implications. It 
maintains that incongruence between the expected lev l of rewards and the actual 
rewards causes emotional distress, in turn individuals try to remove the negative feeling 
by changing their inputs to and/or outcomes from the group in actual or perceived ways.
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The theory also argues that, if changing the input and/or outcome is not possible or is too 
costly, individuals may also leave the relationship (Adams 1965). 
This dissertation focuses on a limitation of previous justice research. Specifically, 
most research on justice theory has assumed that the llocation of rewards at one time is 
independent from the allocation of rewards at other imes (e.g., Adams 1963; Austin and 
Walster 1974). Thus, only a few studies considered th  history of rewards over time when 
investigating the justice process. In most exchange relations in uncontrolled 
environments, however, people are involved in long-term repeated investment-reward 
sequences (Granovetter 1985). In these situations, each reward event is interdependent 
and affects justice evaluations of other rewards. Therefore, the process of justice 
evaluations should be understood as evolving through time. Moreover, according to the 
research on procedural justice, individuals’ justice evaluations are affected by the fairness 
of the decision-making process as well as the results of the decision itself. According to 
the argument about procedural justice put forth by Leventhal (1980), consistent 
application of rules over time and across people is an important factor in producing 
justice evaluations.  
Research on negativity bias (Baumeister et al. 2001) and prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) showed how individuals’ judgments are affected by 
subjectivity. These theories maintained that a negative event (e.g., loss) is perceived as 
stronger than the same magnitude of a positive event (e.g., gain). Justice theory (Adams 
1965) also posited an asymmetric effect between under-rewards and over-rewards (Jasso 
1980). According to this theory, under-reward has a stronger effect on justice evaluations 
than the same amount of over-reward. 
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Extending this line of reasoning, I present a theory of reward stability, justice 
evaluations and group cooperation. According to this t eory, when individuals experience 
an unstable reward system in which rewards fluctuate be ween under-rewards and over-
rewards though time, they will produce a lower leve of justice evaluations than when 
they experience repeated stable rewards through time. The theory also postulates that the 
resulting lower justice evaluations decrease positive emotions and cooperative behaviors 
in groups. 
Three empirical studies were conducted as a part of this work, aiming to test the 
effectiveness of the theory. The first empirical study was based on a nationally 
representative survey from South Korea. In this empirical study, I hypothesized that an 
unstable application of rules in workplaces has a negative effect on employees’ 
willingness to work harder than expected and on their willingness to stay in their 
companies despite a better offer. In this empirical study, I analyzed the 2009 KGSS data 
using logistic regression. The results revealed that if the employees perceived the rules in 
their workplaces as being applied consistently through time, then there was an increase in 
their justice evaluations of wages. This perception is also associated with an increase in 
employees’ willingness to work hard and stay in their current company.   
The second empirical study of this dissertation wasa controlled laboratory 
experiment with three conditions, which aimed to test he theoretical predictions directly 
derived from the theory. In the experiment, the control condition had relatively stable 
rewards over time, whereas in the experimental conditi s, rewards from the group 
fluctuated either mildly (low-instability condition) or severely (high-instability condition). 
Results from multi-level models supported the hypotheses that unstable rewards have a 
99 
 
negative effect on justice evaluations, emotional responses, and behavioral reactions. In 
the experiment, the participants who experienced unstable rewards showed significantly 
lower justice evaluations and higher distress than ose in the stable rewards condition. 
The former group also showed a lower level of cooperation, which was measured as level 
of investment and wiliness to stay in their current groups.  
The results from the experiment also confirm the asymmetric effect between 
under-rewards and over-rewards. Based on prospect th ory and research on negativity 
bias, the current theory assumes that the net effect o  unstable rewards on justice 
evaluations originates from the asymmetry between under-rewards and over-rewards; the 
effect of under-rewards is stronger than the same aount of over-rewards. The results of 
the experiment yielded support for this assumption. In addition, the results indicated that 
a very small amount of instability in rewards decreas s justice evaluations, especially 
when the reward is below the expected level. The findings from this experiment are 
critical in refining our understanding of the process s by which justice evaluations form 
in exchange relations. 
Another controlled laboratory experiment was introduced in Chapter 6. The 
experiment aimed to replicate and extend the results obtained in the previous experiment. 
As this experiment also tested the effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards on 
justice evaluations, two competing predictions from the former research were tested. The 
primacy effect predicted that unstable rewards that appear at an earlier stage in a reward 
sequence have a stronger influence on justice evaluations than those which appear at a 
later stage of the reward sequence. On the other hand, the recency effect predicted that 
unstable rewards have a stronger effect when receivd at a later stage.  
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The results of this experiment confirmed the primacy effect of unstable rewards. 
Among the experimental conditions, justice evaluations are higher in the recency 
conditions than in the primacy conditions. In other words, the unstable rewards at the 
starting point of a repeated rewarding sequence ling r in individuals’ justice perceptions 
stronger than when the unstable rewards appear later. Once unstable rewards lower 
individuals’ justice evaluations, the same extent of compensation at a later point in time 
cannot cancel the effect of unstable rewards perceived earlier. Regarding the presentation 
order between under-rewards and over-rewards, the results revealed that the under-
reward-first condition resulted in a lower level of justice evaluations that the over-
reward-first condition. 
In the control condition, which did not implement ay instability of rewards, the 
justice evaluations were higher than the justice evaluations in the other experimental 
conditions. This confirmed the results of the forme experiment in this dissertation and 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the theory yet again. The results also confirmed the 
asymmetry in the effects of under-reward and over-reward in their magnitudes and 
directions.  
This dissertation demonstrates the importance of the s ability of rewards in 
maintaining justice evaluations and group cooperation. Cooperation among members is 
one of the most important features in upholding groups in human society. Thus, many 
social scientists examine how to maintain an appropriate level of cooperation in human 
society (e.g., Axelrod 1984). Using mixed quantitative methods, this dissertation suggests 
that the stability of rewards is one factor which motivates members to cooperate, while 
the instability of rewards reduces justice evaluations, positive feelings, and cooperative 
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behaviors among individuals, especially when it appears at an early stage of a reward 
sequence.   
This research has implications beyond sociological theory. Specifically, the study 
provides those who determine rewards in formal organizations with empirically validated 
knowledge to enhance investment-reward efficiency without the sacrifice of members’ 
cooperation levels. According to this research, the instability in a reward system itself 
increases costs for organizations wishing to maintain group members’ cooperation levels. 
For instance, in a company that adopts an unstable syst m of rewards, levels of 
cooperation among employees will be lower than in another company with a stable 
system of rewards. Therefore, the first company will either suffer from lower productivity, 
or it will expend more resources to maintain a desirable level of productivity among the 
employees.  
With respect to customer relations and management, r searchers have found that 
justice evaluations play a key role in shaping customers’ satisfaction levels in the service 
recovery process after the customers have experiencd a service failure from the 
company (e.g., del Río-Lanza et al. 2009). This disertation suggests that, if the company 
wants to raise the damaged satisfaction level among customers after a service failure, the 
compensation for the service failure should be greate  than the losses resulting from it, 
because the negative effect of the service failure will be greater than the positive effect of 
the same amount of compensation from the service recovery process. These examples 
illustrate that the instability of rewards will cause overall inefficiency in the organization.  
This research also promises to aid those who are involved in social policy by 
offering the perspective that not only the result of the allocation of resources and burdens 
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at one point in time, but also the experiences of the stability of the allocation patterns 
over time, is a key factor in establishing justice evaluations regarding social institutions 
or government policy among people. Previous research on law compliance showed that 
government policies or political authorities depend upon the people’s voluntary 
cooperation for their prosperity and that the appearance of fairness is an important 
antecedent of cooperation (Tyler 1990, 2010). Findings of the present research 
demonstrated that the stability of rewards from a group affect people’s justice evaluations 
and willingness to comply with the group.  
Many social policies regulate the allocation of burdens and benefits among people 
in society. Therefore, changes in social policies will be advantageous to some individuals 
and disadvantageous to others. If social policies ar  changed too frequently, more 
individuals will feel that the policies are unfavorable to them and will perceive the 
policies or social institutions as unjust. Therefor, governmental policy and social 
intuitions need to avoid unnecessary change and should aim for stability, as long as the 
stability of social policy does not conflict with te overall social justice.  
In summary, this research investigated the role of stability of rewards in groups 
and its findings suggest that the instability of rewards itself has a negative effect on 
justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and cooperation among group members. This 
confirms the importance of reward stability on group cooperation. In addition, the results 
reported here suggest that not just the results of an allocation at one time, but also the 
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APPENDIX A – KGSS 2008 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Demographic Variables  
Now I would like to ask about your family members. Please include all family members 
who are living in your house and who are temporarily living somewhere else. Answer the 
following questions beginning with yourself.  
(Write down the person’s relationship to the respondent first, and then ask the person’s 
sex, age, marital status, co-residence status, the reason for living elsewhere, employment 
status, and the reason for not working. make sure to ask about each and everyone counted 
in questions 34, 35 and 36 above.) 
1) Relation to respondent 
2) Is [PERSON] male or female? 
3) How old is [PERSON]? 
4) Is [PERSON] now married, widowed, divorced, separated, cohabiting, or never 
married? 
5) Is [PERSON] living in your house, or is [PERSON] staying somewhere else? 
6) (IF [PERSON] IS TEMPORARILY STAYING ELSEWHERE) What is the 
primary reason for not living together? 
 
What is the highest level of school you have attended? 
0) No formal school   1) Elementary school 
2) Junior high school   3) High school 
4) Junior college   5) College (Four-year course) 
6) Graduate school (Masters)  7) Graduate school (PhD) 
 
Do you work for someone else? 
1) Yes     2) No 
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Before taxes and other deductions, what is your total monthly average income from this 
job? This includes your base pay, bonuses, and other allowances. (If the respondent does 
not have a regular monthly income (ex. farmer), then divide the estimated annual income 
by 12.   About _____ (10,000) won (88) don’t know 
 
Social Class  
In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to 
be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top (10) to bottom (1). Where 
would you put yourself now on this scale? 
_____ 
 
Arbitrariness   
To what extent do you agree or disagree that the decisions on personnel policy (e.g., pay 
and promotions) occur in the following ways in your company? 
The decision making is affected by decision makers' prejudices and sentiments.  
1) Strongly agree   2) Agree 
3) Neither agree nor disagree   4) Disagree 
5) Strongly Disagree  
 
The rules and principles of decision making are not consistent. 
1) Strongly agree   2) Agree 
3) Neither agree nor disagree   4) Disagree 
5) Strongly Disagree  
 
Justice Evaluation  
Is your pay just? I am not asking about what you do earn, nor what you would like to 
earn--but what you feel is just given your skills and effort. If you are not working now, 
please tell about your last occupation 
1) Much less than is just  2) A little less than is ju t 
3) About just for me   4) A little more than is just 
5) Much more than is just 
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Willingness to work hard  
I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work 
for succeed. 
1) Strongly agree   2) Agree 
3) Neither agree nor disagree   4) Disagree 
5) Strongly Disagree  
 
Willingness to Stay 
I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this 
organization. 
1) Strongly agree   2) Agree 
3) Neither agree nor disagree   4) Disagree 
5) Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX B – THE RESULTS OF BRANT TEST FOR THE PROPORTIONAL ODDS 
ASSUMPTION 
 
Table B.1 Brant Test for Table 4.2 – Model 2 
Justice Evaluations Chi2 p > Chi2 d.f. 
All 13.23 .584 15 
Age 2.25 .522 3 
Education 2.48 .480 3 
Income 1.11 .774 3 
Social Class 4.95 .176 3 
No Arbitrariness  .62 .892 3 
 
Table B.2 Brant Test for Table 4.2 – Model 3 
Justice Evaluations Chi2 p > Chi2 d.f. 
All 12.59     .634 15 
Age 1.00 .800 3 
Education 1.61 .657 3 
Income 1.38 .711 3 
Social Class 4.42 .219 3 





Table B.3 Brant Test for Table 4.3 – Model 2 
Staying Chi2 p > Chi2 d.f. 
All 39.11    .022 21 
Female 3.27 .352 3 
Age 1.91 .591 3 
Education 1.84 .606 3 
Income 1.88 .597 3 
Social Class .31 .312 3 
Married .42 .419 3 
No Arbitrariness  2.35 .861 3 
 
Table B.4 Brant Test for Table 4.3 – Model 3 
Staying Chi2 p > Chi2 d.f. 
All 39.55    .008 21 
Female 3.38 .336 3 
Age 2.12 .549 3 
Education 2.08 .555 3 
Income 1.93 .587 3 
Social Class 3.5 .321 3 
Married 3.05 .384 3 





Table B.5 Brant Test for Table 4.4 – Model 2 
Working Hard Chi2 p > Chi2 d.f. 
All 22.36   .379 21 
Female 1.23 .745 3 
Age .96 .812 3 
Education 2.03 .567 3 
Income 2.36 .501 3 
Social Class 11.98 .007 3 
Married 2.69 .448 3 
No Arbitrariness .47 .924 3 
 
 
Table B.6 Brant Test for Table 4.3 – Model 3 
Working Hard Chi2 p > Chi2 d.f. 
All 22.42    .376 21 
Female 1.26 .738 3 
Age .98 .805 3 
Education 2.03 .567 3 
Income 2.49 .476 3 
Social Class 11.90 .008 3 
Married 2.66 .447 3 








We are members of a research team of social scientists who are interested in studying 
group cooperation. In today’s study, you will belong to a task group. In that group, you 
will be randomly assigned to the role of decider (manager) or contributor (programmer)  
 
Let’s assume the following situation: There are frelance computer programmers who are 
now working alone. A computer program company finds out that there are demands for a 
bunch of new computer programs in the market and the programmers are able to develop 
the programs. The company suggest that the programmers develop the new programs 
together. It will guarantee better profits to the programmers than if developed and sell the 
program by themselves, because the company will advertise and ensure mass distribution. 
Thus, the programmers decide to work together in the company.  
 
To develop the programs, the programmers will decide how much time and skill they will 
invest in the project. This amount will be represented by “resource unit (RU)” in this 
experiment. After they develop each program, the company sells it on the market on 
behalf of the programmers. Then the manager of the company will distributed the 
revenues on the programmers.  
 
In this study, one group is composed of 4 participants who are randomly assigned to two 
different roles: a manger and a programmer. Only one participants will be assigned to the 
manager’s role. If you assigned to be a manager, you will not be involved in developing 
computer programs. But after each program is developed through the programmers’ 
investments, the manager will divided the revenue among the programmers according to
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the amount of work they invested in the program. As a manager, you will be informed of 
all programmers’ investments levels in the task. Thus, you can use this information in 
deciding reward allocations.  
 
The rest of the participants will be assigned to a programmer’s role. If you are assigned to 
be a programmer, you are supposed to develop a new program in each session with your 
RUs(resource units) which represents your time and skills that are ready to invest. You 
will start every session with some initial RUs. After investment, you will get paid from 
the participant who is assigned to the manager’s role. You are only able to know about 
your own investment and reward information. The other programmer’s level of 
investments a rewards will be unknown.  
 
Now, let’s begin with the study with assigning your role. Please wait while the 
experimenter is randomly assigning the roles of each participants…. You are assigned to 
a programmer’s role. You are programmer 2 (P2).  
 
Let’s talk more about the programmer’s role. Each programmer has 500RUs in each 
session that can be invested to develop a new program. The products developed by you 
and other programmers will be sold in market by the manager’s effort, and will bring 
1.5(150%) times higher revenue to the company. The participant who is assigned to be a 
manager is supposed to decide your payment. The company’s payment guideline 
recommends that the invested group RUs from the programmers will be multiplied by 
1.3(130%) and returned back to the programmers. However, it is the manager who finally 
decides programmers’ payments, and your payment can vary according to the manager’s 
decision. The rest of the profit: total revenue – programmers’ payment, will be the 
payment for the manager.  
 
While the manager has final say over payment amounts from investment, programmers 
can decide how much to invest from their RUs. You can keep the RUs not invested in the 
group task. The programmers will develop several different programs and will be asked 
to decide their investment in each time.  
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Importantly, your total RUs will be converted in to real money with at the end of the 
experiment and paid to you. That is, you will paid for the RUs that you do not invest and 
for your payments from investments throughout the experiment. The RUs you earn from 
this experiments will be rounded up to the nearest thousandth and converted to $1 per 
1000 RUs. For example, if you earn 6200RUs, you will get $7. 
 
Quizzes (Bolds are the right answers) 
 
How many people are in your group?  
 1 person  3 people  4 people  5 people  
 
How many programmers are in your group?  
 1 programmer  3 programmers  
4 programmers  5 programmers 
 
You are assigned to be _______. 
 A manager   A programmer  
 An experimenter  Neither of them 
 
According to the company’s guidelines, each programmer’s invested RUs will be 
multiplied by about ______ times and returned to the programmer. 
 1.0 times   1.3 times  
 1.5 times  2.0 times 
 
If you invest in 400RUs to develop the program, how much RUs would you expect to 
earn from the company? 
 360 RUs   400 RUs 






Questionnaire (Each set of questionnaire was administered after each trial) 
 
My Payment form the company were  
Very Unjust   1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10  Very Just  
 
How angry do you feel about your returns on investments? 
Not angry at all   1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very angry  
 
How satisfied do you feel about your returns on investments? 
Not satisfied at all   1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10  Very satisfied  
 
How resentful do you feel about your returns on investments? 
Not resentful at all   1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10  Very resentful  
 
How disappointed do you feel about your returns on investments? 
Not disappointed at all  1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very disappointed 
 
If another company were to offer you another positin, which is expected to pay a little 
more, would you want to switch jobs?  







APPENDIX D – MULTI-LEVEL MODEL SELECTION 
 
This appendix presents a series of model specifications which are used for analyses in 
chapter 5. The preferred model in each specification is highlighted in gray.  
 
Table D.1 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Justice Evaluations  
Justice Evaluations -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 6367.4 1 
   
Manipulation  5888.7 2 478.7 1 < .001 
Condition  6342.7 4    
M1 + C2 5851.5 5 491.2 1 < .001 
M + C + M×C 5762.6 8 88.9 3 < .001 
Full Model 5769.0 14    
1 Manipulation of Rewards  
2 Condition 
 
Table D.2 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Anger 
Anger -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 6334.7 1    
Manipulation  5751.3 2 583.4 1 < .001 
Condition  6299.2 4    
M1 + C2 5693.1 5 606.1 1 < .001 
M + C + M×C 5581.8 8 111.3 3 < .001 
Full Model 5581.9 14    




Table D.3 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Disappointment  
Disappointment -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 6459.5 1    
Manipulation  5803.8 2 655.7 1 < .001 
Condition  6429.5 4    
M1 + C2 5751.6 5 677.9 1 < .001 
M + C + M×C 5564.9 8 186.7 3 < .001 
Full Model 5558.1 14 6.8 9 .658 





Table D.4 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Resentment 
Resentment -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 6267.6 1    
Manipulation  5802.5 2 465.1 1 < .001 
Condition  6250.6 4    
M1 + C2 5777.0 5 473.6 1 < .001 
M + C + M×C 5696.4 8 80.6 3 < .001 
Full Model 5690.8 14 5.6 9 .779 











Table D.5 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Satisfaction 
Satisfaction -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 6476.5 1    
Manipulation  5749.8 2 726.7 1 < .001 
Condition  6449.5 4    
M1 + C2 5699.9 5 749.6 1 < .001 
M + C + M×C 5499.8 8 200.1 3 < .001 
Full Model 5493.5 14 6.3 9 .710 




Table D.6 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Investment (with the trial) 
Invest -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 15660.8 1    
Condition  15579.3 4 81.5 3 < .001 
Trial 15513.5 15 63.8 11 < .001 
T1 + C2 15429.6 18 85.9 3 < .001 
T + C + T×C 15173.4 60 256.2 42 < .001 
Full Model 15103.2 66 70.2 6 < .001 








Table D.7 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Staying Behavior 
Staying -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 6507.9 1    
Manipulation  6360.2 2 147.7 1 < .001 
Condition  6473.6 4    
M1 + C2 6321.1 5 152.5 1 < .001 
M + C + M×C 6280.5 8 40.6 3 < .001 
Full Model 6236.7 14 43.8 9 < .001 





Table D.8 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Justice Evaluations 
Justice Evaluations -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 4823.0 105       
Ante(1) 5471.7 27 648.7 78 < .001 
AR(1) 5706.0 2 883.0 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 5655.4 15 832.4 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 5587.0 3 764.0 102 < .001 
CS 5587.1 2 764.1 103 < .001 
CSH 5533.4 15 710.4 90 < .001 
TOEP 5176.4 14 353.4 91 < .001 
TOEPH 5371.1 27 548.1 78 < .001 








Table D.9 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Anger 
Anger -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 4583.8 105       
Ante(1) 5173.3 27 589.5 78 < .001 
AR(1) 5484.2 2 900.4 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 5287.6 15 703.8 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 5330.7 3 746.9 102 < .001 
CS 5330.9 2 747.1 103 < .001 
CSH 5146.6 15 562.8 90 < .001 
TOEP 5164.4 14 580.6 91 < .001 
TOEPH 5004.2 27 420.4 78 < .001 




Table D.6 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Disappointment 
Disappointment -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 4677.0 105       
Ante(1) 5154.7 27 477.7 78 < .001 
AR(1) 5458.0 2 781.0 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 5291.7 15 614.7 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 5330.3 3 653.3 102 < .001 
CS 5337.1 2 660.1 103 < .001 
CSH 5188.9 15 511.9 90 < .001 
TOEP 5199.3 14 522.3 91 < .001 
TOEPH 5062.7 27 385.7 78 < .001 




Table D.7 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Resentment 
Resentment -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 4728.5 105       
Ante(1) 5270.2 27 541.7 78 < .001 
AR(1) 5567.4 2 838.9 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 5389.2 15 660.7 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 5388.9 3 660.4 102 < .001 
CS 5389.0 2 660.5 103 < .001 
CSH 5217.3 15 488.8 90 < .001 
TOEP 5248.7 14 520.2 91 < .001 
TOEPH 5092.0 27 363.5 78 < .001 




Table D.8 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Satisfaction 
Satisfaction -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 4745.7 105       
Ante(1) 5197.6 27 451.9 78 < .001 
AR(1) 5412.4 2 666.7 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 5211.5 15 465.8 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 5285.7 3 540.0 102 < .001 
CS 5286.8 2 541.1 103 < .001 
CSH 5211.5 15 465.8 90 < .001 
TOEP 5004.0 14 258.3 91 < .001 
TOEPH 5138.9 27 393.2 78 < .001 




Table D.9 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Investment 
Investment -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 14481.7 105       
Ante(1) 14739.3 27 257.6 78 < .001 
AR(1) 14820.2 2 338.5 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 14773.4 15 291.7 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 14688.7 3 207.0 102 < .001 
CS 14724.9 2 243.2 103 < .001 
CSH 14686.4 15 204.7 90 < .001 
TOEP 14666.2 14 184.5 91 < .001 
TOEPH 14624.9 27 143.2 78 < .001 




Table D.10 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Staying 
Staying -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 4912.2 105       
Ante(1) 5505.4 27 593.2 78 < .001 
AR(1) 5703.9 2 791.7 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 5634.9 15 722.7 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 5426.7 3 514.5 102 < .001 
CS 5461.9 2 549.7 103 < .001 
CSH 5423.8 15 511.6 90 < .001 
TOEP 5353.1 14 440.9 91 < .001 
TOEPH 5307.0 27 394.8 78 < .001 




These present a series of model specifications which are used for analyses in chapter 6. 
The preferred model in each specification is highlighted in gray.  
 
Table D.11 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Justice Evaluations 
Justice Evaluations  -2LL # of Parameter Chi2 d.f. p-value 
Null Model 10910.8 1    
P + R + P×R 10889.4 9 21.4 8 .006 




Table D.12 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Justice Evaluations 
Justice Evaluations -2LL # of parameters Chi2 d.f. p-value 
UN 8391.0 171     
Ante(1) 8969.0 35 578.0 78 < .001 
AR(1) 9461.6 2 1070.6 103 < .001 
ARH(1) 9303.2 19 912.2 90 < .001 
ARMA(1,1) 9453.7 3 1062.7 102 < .001 
CS 10794.4 2 2403.4 103 < .001 
CSH 10183.8 19 1792.8 90 < .001 
TOEP 9300.1 18 909.1 91 < .001 
TOEPH 9165.9 35 774.9 78 < .001 
VC 10889.4 1 2498.4 104 < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
